[PATCH v13 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls

[Paul Moore]

On Wed, Jul 3, 2024 at 7:08 PM KP Singh <kpsingh at kernel.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 4, 2024 at 12:52 AM Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 3, 2024 at 6:22 PM KP Singh <kpsingh at kernel.org> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Jul 3, 2024 at 10:56 PM Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Jul 3, 2024 at 12:55 PM KP Singh <kpsingh at kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > > On Wed, Jul 3, 2024 at 2:07 AM Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > > > > > On Jun 29, 2024 KP Singh <kpsingh at kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > LSM hooks are currently invoked from a linked list as indirect calls
> > > > > > > which are invoked using retpolines as a mitigation for speculative
> > > > > > > attacks (Branch History / Target injection) and add extra overhead which
> > > > > > > is especially bad in kernel hot paths:

...

> > > > I'm not aware of any other existing problems relating to the LSM hook
> > > > default values, if there are any, we need to fix them independent of
> > > > this patchset.  The LSM framework should function properly if the
> > > > "default" values are used.
> > >
> > > Patch 5 eliminates the possibilities of errors and subtle bugs all
> > > together. The problem with subtle bugs is, well, they are subtle, if
> > > you and I knew of the bugs, we would fix all of them, but we don't. I
> > > really feel we ought to eliminate the class of issues and not just
> > > whack-a-mole when we see the bugs.
> >
> > Here's the thing, I don't really like patch 5/5.  To be honest, I
> > don't really like a lot of this patchset.  From my perspective, the
> > complexity of the code is likely going to mean more maintenance
> > headaches down the road, but Linus hath spoken so we're doing this
> > (although "this" is still a bit undefined as far as I'm concerned).
> > If you want me to merge patch 5/5 you've got to give me something real
> > and convincing that can't be fixed by any other means.  My current
> > opinion is that you're trying to use a previously fixed bug to scare
> > and/or coerce the merging of some changes I don't really want to
> > merge.  If you want me to take patch 5/5, you've got to give me a
> > reason that is far more compelling that what you've written thus far.
>
> Paul, I am not scaring you, I am providing a solution that saves us
> from headaches with side-effects and bugs in the future. It's safer by
> design.

Perhaps I wasn't clear enough in my previous emails; instead of trying
to convince me that your solution is literally the best possible thing
to ever touch the kernel, convince me that there is a problem we need
to fix.  Right now, I'm not convinced there is a bug that requires all
of the extra code in patch 5/5 (all of which have the potential to
introduce new bugs).  As mentioned previously, the bugs that typically
have been used as examples of unwanted side effects with the LSM hooks
have been resolved, both in the specific and general case.  If you
want me to add more code/functionality to fix a bug, you must first
demonstrate the bug exists and the risk is real; you have not done
that as far as I'm concerned.

> You say you have not reviewed it carefully ...

That may have been true of previous versions of this patchset, but I
did not say that about this current patchset.

> ... but you did ask me to move
> the function from the BPF LSM layer to an LSM API, and we had a bunch
> of discussion around naming in the subsequent revisions.
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/f7e8a16b0815d9d901e019934d684c5f@paul-moore.com/

That discussion predates commit 61df7b828204 ("lsm: fixup the inode
xattr capability handling") which is currently in the lsm/dev branch,
marked for stable, and will go up to Linus during the upcoming merge
window.

> My reasons are:
>
> 1. It's safer, no side effects, guaranteed to be not buggy. Neither
> you, nor me, can guarantee that a default value will be safe in the
> LSM layer.

In the first sentence above you "guarantee" that your code is not
buggy and then follow that up with a second sentence discussing how no
one can guarantee source code safety.  Regardless of whatever point
you were trying to make here, I maintain that *all* patches have the
potential for bugs, even those that are attempting to fix bugs.  With
that in mind, if you want me to merge more code to fix a bug (class),
a bug that I've mentioned several times now that I believe we've
already fixed, you first MUST convince me that the bug (class) still
exists.  You have not done that.

> 2. Performance, no extra function call.

Convince me the bug still exists first and then we can discuss the
merits of whatever solutions are proposed.

-- 
paul-moore.com