[PATCH v13 3/5] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
KP Singh
kpsingh at kernel.org
Thu Jul 4 01:15:41 UTC 2024
On Thu, Jul 4, 2024 at 2:24 AM KP Singh <kpsingh at kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jul 4, 2024 at 2:04 AM Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> >
> > On 7/3/2024 4:08 PM, KP Singh wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jul 4, 2024 at 12:52 AM Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > >> On Wed, Jul 3, 2024 at 6:22 PM KP Singh <kpsingh at kernel.org> wrote:
> > >>> On Wed, Jul 3, 2024 at 10:56 PM Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > >>>> On Wed, Jul 3, 2024 at 12:55 PM KP Singh <kpsingh at kernel.org> wrote:
> > >>>>> On Wed, Jul 3, 2024 at 2:07 AM Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > >>>>>> On Jun 29, 2024 KP Singh <kpsingh at kernel.org> wrote:
> > >>>>>>> LSM hooks are currently invoked from a linked list as indirect calls
> > >>>>>>> which are invoked using retpolines as a mitigation for speculative
> > >>>>>>> attacks (Branch History / Target injection) and add extra overhead which
> > >>>>>>> is especially bad in kernel hot paths:
> > >>>>> [...]
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>>> should fix the more obvious problems. I'd like to know if you are
> > >>>>>> aware of any others? If not, the text above should be adjusted and
> > >>>>>> we should reconsider patch 5/5. If there are other problems I'd
> > >>>>>> like to better understand them as there may be an independent
> > >>>>>> solution for those particular problems.
> > >>>>> We did have problems with some other hooks but I was unable to dig up
> > >>>>> specific examples though, it's been a while. More broadly speaking, a
> > >>>>> default decision is still a decision. Whereas the intent from the BPF
> > >>>>> LSM is not to make a default decision unless a BPF program is loaded.
> > >>>>> I am quite worried about the holes this leaves open, subtle bugs
> > >>>>> (security or crashes) we have not caught yet and PATCH 5/5 engineers away
> > >>>>> the problem of the "default decision".
> > >>>> The inode/xattr problem you originally mentioned wasn't really rooted
> > >>>> in a "bad" default return value, it was really an issue with how the
> > >>>> LSM hook was structured due to some legacy design assumptions made
> > >>>> well before the initial stacking patches were merged. That should be
> > >>>> fixed now[1] and given that the inode/xattr set/remove hooks were
> > >>>> unique in this regard (individual LSMs were responsible for performing
> > >>>> the capabilities checks) I don't expect this to be a general problem.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> There were also some issues caused by the fact that we were defining
> > >>>> the default return value in multiple places and these values had gone
> > >>>> out of sync in a number of hooks. We've also fixed this problem by
> > >>>> only defining the default return value once for each hook, solving all
> > >>>> of those problems.
> > >>> I don't see how this solves problems or prevents any future problems
> > >>> with side-effects. I have always been uncomfortable with an extraneous
> > >>> function being called with a side effect ever since we merged BPF LSM
> > >>> with default callback. We have found one bug due to this, not all the
> > >>> bugs.
> > >> You've got to give me something more concrete than that. If you can't
> > >> provide any concrete examples, start with providing a basic concept
> > >> with far more detail than just "side-effects".
> > >>
> > >>>> I'm not aware of any other existing problems relating to the LSM hook
> > >>>> default values, if there are any, we need to fix them independent of
> > >>>> this patchset. The LSM framework should function properly if the
> > >>>> "default" values are used.
> > >>> Patch 5 eliminates the possibilities of errors and subtle bugs all
> > >>> together. The problem with subtle bugs is, well, they are subtle, if
> > >>> you and I knew of the bugs, we would fix all of them, but we don't. I
> > >>> really feel we ought to eliminate the class of issues and not just
> > >>> whack-a-mole when we see the bugs.
> > >> Here's the thing, I don't really like patch 5/5. To be honest, I
> > >> don't really like a lot of this patchset. From my perspective, the
> > >> complexity of the code is likely going to mean more maintenance
> > >> headaches down the road, but Linus hath spoken so we're doing this
> > >> (although "this" is still a bit undefined as far as I'm concerned).
> > >> If you want me to merge patch 5/5 you've got to give me something real
> > >> and convincing that can't be fixed by any other means. My current
> > >> opinion is that you're trying to use a previously fixed bug to scare
> > >> and/or coerce the merging of some changes I don't really want to
> > >> merge. If you want me to take patch 5/5, you've got to give me a
> > >> reason that is far more compelling that what you've written thus far.
> > > Paul, I am not scaring you, I am providing a solution that saves us
> > > from headaches with side-effects and bugs in the future. It's safer by
> > > design.
> > >
> > > You say you have not reviewed it carefully, but you did ask me to move
> > > the function from the BPF LSM layer to an LSM API, and we had a bunch
> > > of discussion around naming in the subsequent revisions.
> > >
> > > https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/f7e8a16b0815d9d901e019934d684c5f@paul-moore.com/
> > >
> > > My reasons are:
> > >
> > > 1. It's safer, no side effects, guaranteed to be not buggy. Neither
> > > you, nor me, can guarantee that a default value will be safe in the
> > > LSM layer. I request others (Casey, Kees) for their opinion here too.
> > > 2. Performance, no extra function call.
> >
> > I want to be very careful about the comments I make on this patch set.
> > I can't say that I trust any fix for the BPF LSM layer. My natural
> > inclination is to isolate the fix to the area that has the problem,
> > that is, BPF. I have a hard time accepting the notion that the implementation
> > will really fix all possible bugs in the future. The pace at which eBPF
> > is evolving gives me the heebee geebees when I think of it as a mechanism
> > for implementing security modules.
> >
> > My biggest concern is that we may be trying too hard for perfection.
> > I see a situation where we're not moving forward because there are two
> > reasonable solutions and rather than running with either we're desperately
> > looking for a compelling reason to pick one over the other.
>
> I am fine with either, if you folks prefer security_toggle_hook to be
> in BPF only / limited to BPF. I can revert back to what we had in v9,
> the changes to the LSM layer are then very minimal.
Now if you folks really don't want any changes to the core LSM layer,
that too is doable, the patch below accomplishes that.
So, here's where we are at, while the LSM framework is comfortable
with saying that default values and empty callbacks are fine, that's
not what BPF LSM is comfortable doing. Your concerns around changes to
the LSM layer should be addressed by the propose patch below:
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
index 1de7ece5d36d..5a2ab1067095 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog,
bool bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(u32 btf_id);
bool bpf_lsm_is_trusted(const struct bpf_prog *prog);
+void bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(void *addr, bool value);
static inline struct bpf_storage_blob *bpf_inode(
const struct inode *inode)
@@ -52,6 +53,10 @@ static inline bool bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(u32 btf_id)
return false;
}
+static inline void bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(void *addr, bool value)
+{
+}
+
static inline bool bpf_lsm_is_trusted(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
return false;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
index f8302a5ca400..bc59025b3d46 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
@@ -523,6 +523,22 @@ static enum bpf_tramp_prog_type
bpf_attach_type_to_tramp(struct bpf_prog *prog)
}
}
+static void bpf_trampoline_toggle_lsm(struct bpf_trampoline *tr,
+ enum bpf_tramp_prog_type kind)
+{
+ struct bpf_tramp_link *link;
+ bool found = false;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(link, &tr->progs_hlist[kind], tramp_hlist) {
+ if (link->link.prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(tr->func.addr, found);
+}
+
static int __bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link,
struct bpf_trampoline *tr)
{
enum bpf_tramp_prog_type kind;
@@ -562,6 +578,10 @@ static int __bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct
bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_tr
hlist_add_head(&link->tramp_hlist, &tr->progs_hlist[kind]);
tr->progs_cnt[kind]++;
+
+ if (link->link.prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM)
+ bpf_trampoline_toggle_lsm(tr, kind);
+
err = bpf_trampoline_update(tr, true /* lock_direct_mutex */);
if (err) {
hlist_del_init(&link->tramp_hlist);
@@ -595,6 +615,10 @@ static int __bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog(struct
bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_
}
hlist_del_init(&link->tramp_hlist);
tr->progs_cnt[kind]--;
+
+ if (link->link.prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM)
+ bpf_trampoline_toggle_lsm(tr, kind);
+
return bpf_trampoline_update(tr, true /* lock_direct_mutex */);
}
diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
index 57b9ffd53c98..9ca3db6d2b07 100644
--- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
+++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
@@ -16,6 +16,29 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[]
__ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, bpf_task_storage_free),
};
+void bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(void *addr, bool enable)
+{
+ struct lsm_static_call *scalls;
+ struct security_hook_list *h;
+ int i, j;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks); i++) {
+ h = &bpf_lsm_hooks[i];
+ if (h->hook.lsm_func_addr != addr)
+ continue;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < MAX_LSM_COUNT; j++) {
+ scalls = &h->scalls[j];
+ if (scalls->hl != &bpf_lsm_hooks[i])
+ continue;
+ if (enable)
+ static_branch_enable(scalls->active);
+ else
+ static_branch_disable(scalls->active);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
static const struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid = {
.name = "bpf",
.id = LSM_ID_BPF,
@@ -23,8 +46,14 @@ static const struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid = {
static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
{
+ int i;
+
security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
&bpf_lsmid);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks); i++)
+ bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(bpf_lsm_hooks[i].hook.lsm_func_addr, false);
+
pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
return 0;
}
- KP
>
> - KP
>
> >
> > >
> > > If you still don't like it, it's your call, I would still like to keep
> > > most of the logic local to the BPF LSM as proposed in
> > > https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/f7e8a16b0815d9d901e019934d684c5f@paul-moore.com/
> > >
> > > - KP
> > >
> > >> --
> > >> paul-moore.com
More information about the Linux-security-module-archive
mailing list