[PoC][PATCH] bpf: Call return value check function in the JITed code
Roberto Sassu
roberto.sassu at huaweicloud.com
Fri Nov 18 08:44:29 UTC 2022
On 11/16/2022 6:12 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 11/16/2022 7:47 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
>> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
>>
>> eBPF allows certain types of eBPF programs to modify the return value of
>> the functions they attach to. This is used for example by BPF LSM to let
>> security modules make their decision on LSM hooks.
>>
>> The JITed code looks like the following:
>>
>> ret = bpf_lsm_inode_permission_impl1(); // from a security module
>> if (ret)
>> goto out;
>>
>> ..
>>
>> ret = bpf_lsm_inode_permission_implN(); // from a security module
>> if (ret)
>> goto out;
>>
>> ret = bpf_lsm_inode_permission(); // in the kernel, returns DEFAULT
>> out:
>>
>> If ret is not zero, the attachment points of BPF LSM are not executed. For
>> this reason, the return value check cannot be done there.
>>
>> Instead, the idea is to use the LSM_HOOK() macro to define a per-hook check
>> function.
>>
>> Whenever an eBPF program attaches to an LSM hook, the eBPF verifier
>> resolves the address of the check function (whose name is
>> bpf_lsm_<hook name>_ret()) and adds a call to that function just after the
>> out label. If the return value is illegal, the check function changes it
>> back to the default value defined by the LSM infrastructure:
>>
>> ..
>>
>> out:
>> ret = bpf_lsm_inode_permission_ret(ret);
>
> As I've mentioned elsewhere, the return value is a small part of
> the problem you have with eBPF programs and the BPF LSM. Because
> the LSM infrastructure is inconsistent with regard to return codes,
> values returned in pointers and use of secids there is no uniform
> mechanism that I can see to address the "legitimate return" problem.
>
> Lets look at one of the ickyest interfaces we have, security_getprocattr().
> It returns the size of a string that it has allocated. It puts the
> pointer to the allocated buffer into a char **value that was passed to it.
> If bpf_getprocattr() returns a positive number and sets value to NULL Bad
> Things can happen. If the return value is greater than the size allocated
> ditto. If it returns an error but allocates a string you get a memory leak.
I hope I understood how it works correctly, but you cannot modify
directly data accessible from a pointer provided as parameter by the LSM
hook you attach to. The pointer is treated as scalar value and the eBPF
verifier detects any attempt to dereference as an illegal access. The
only way to modify such data is through helpers that need to be properly
declared to be usable by eBPF programs.
Also, if I'm not mistaken we have the limitation of five parameters per
functions. Not sure what happens for hooks that have more than this.
> security_secid_to_secctx() has to work in concert with security_release_secctx()
> to do memory lifecycle management. If secid_to_secctx() allocates memory
> release_secctx() has to free it, while if secid_to_secctx() doesn't allocate
> memory it better not. (SELinux allocates memory, Smack does not. It's a real
> distinction) Your return checker would need to understand a lot more about
> the behavior of your eBPF programs than what value they return.
I see. Within an eBPF program we are able to pair allocation and free
together. I guess something similar could be done for pairs of LSM hooks.
Roberto
>> In this way, an eBPF program cannot cause illegal return values to be sent
>> to BPF LSM, and to the callers of the LSM infrastructure.
>>
>> This is just a PoC, to validate the idea and get an early feedback.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
>> ---
>> arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 7 ++++---
>> arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
>> include/linux/bpf.h | 4 +++-
>> kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
>> kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c | 2 +-
>> kernel/bpf/trampoline.c | 6 ++++--
>> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>> 7 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
>> index 62f805f427b7..5412230c6935 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
>> @@ -1764,7 +1764,7 @@ static void restore_args(struct jit_ctx *ctx, int args_off, int nargs)
>> */
>> static int prepare_trampoline(struct jit_ctx *ctx, struct bpf_tramp_image *im,
>> struct bpf_tramp_links *tlinks, void *orig_call,
>> - int nargs, u32 flags)
>> + void *ret_check_call, int nargs, u32 flags)
>> {
>> int i;
>> int stack_size;
>> @@ -1963,7 +1963,7 @@ static int prepare_trampoline(struct jit_ctx *ctx, struct bpf_tramp_image *im,
>> int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *image,
>> void *image_end, const struct btf_func_model *m,
>> u32 flags, struct bpf_tramp_links *tlinks,
>> - void *orig_call)
>> + void *orig_call, void *ret_check_call)
>> {
>> int i, ret;
>> int nargs = m->nr_args;
>> @@ -1983,7 +1983,8 @@ int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *image,
>> return -ENOTSUPP;
>> }
>>
>> - ret = prepare_trampoline(&ctx, im, tlinks, orig_call, nargs, flags);
>> + ret = prepare_trampoline(&ctx, im, tlinks, orig_call, ret_check_call,
>> + nargs, flags);
>> if (ret < 0)
>> return ret;
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
>> index cec5195602bc..6cd727b4af0a 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
>> @@ -2123,7 +2123,7 @@ static int invoke_bpf_mod_ret(const struct btf_func_model *m, u8 **pprog,
>> int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *image, void *image_end,
>> const struct btf_func_model *m, u32 flags,
>> struct bpf_tramp_links *tlinks,
>> - void *func_addr)
>> + void *func_addr, void *func_ret_check_addr)
>> {
>> int ret, i, nr_args = m->nr_args, extra_nregs = 0;
>> int regs_off, ip_off, args_off, stack_size = nr_args * 8, run_ctx_off;
>> @@ -2280,6 +2280,21 @@ int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *image, void *i
>> for (i = 0; i < fmod_ret->nr_links; i++)
>> emit_cond_near_jump(&branches[i], prog, branches[i],
>> X86_JNE);
>> +
>> + if (func_ret_check_addr) {
>> + emit_ldx(&prog, BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_FP, -8);
>> +
>> + /* call ret check function */
>> + if (emit_call(&prog, func_ret_check_addr, prog)) {
>> + ret = -EINVAL;
>> + goto cleanup;
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* remember return value in a stack for bpf prog to access */
>> + emit_stx(&prog, BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_0, -8);
>> + memcpy(prog, x86_nops[5], X86_PATCH_SIZE);
>> + prog += X86_PATCH_SIZE;
>> + }
>> }
>>
>> if (fexit->nr_links)
>> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
>> index 49f9d2bec401..f3551f7bdc28 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/bpf.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
>> @@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ struct bpf_tramp_image;
>> int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *tr, void *image, void *image_end,
>> const struct btf_func_model *m, u32 flags,
>> struct bpf_tramp_links *tlinks,
>> - void *orig_call);
>> + void *orig_call, void *ret_call);
>> u64 notrace __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable_recur(struct bpf_prog *prog,
>> struct bpf_tramp_run_ctx *run_ctx);
>> void notrace __bpf_prog_exit_sleepable_recur(struct bpf_prog *prog, u64 start,
>> @@ -974,6 +974,7 @@ struct bpf_trampoline {
>> struct {
>> struct btf_func_model model;
>> void *addr;
>> + void *ret_check_addr;
>> bool ftrace_managed;
>> } func;
>> /* if !NULL this is BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT program that extends another BPF
>> @@ -994,6 +995,7 @@ struct bpf_trampoline {
>> struct bpf_attach_target_info {
>> struct btf_func_model fmodel;
>> long tgt_addr;
>> + long tgt_ret_check_addr;
>> const char *tgt_name;
>> const struct btf_type *tgt_type;
>> };
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
>> index 37bcedf5a44e..f7f25d0064dd 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
>> @@ -18,6 +18,17 @@
>> #include <linux/ima.h>
>> #include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h>
>>
>> +static bool is_ret_value_allowed(int ret, u32 ret_flags)
>> +{
>> + if ((ret < 0 && !(ret_flags & LSM_RET_NEG)) ||
>> + (ret == 0 && !(ret_flags & LSM_RET_ZERO)) ||
>> + (ret == 1 && !(ret_flags & LSM_RET_ONE)) ||
>> + (ret > 1 && !(ret_flags & LSM_RET_GT_ONE)))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> + return true;
>> +}
>> +
>> /* For every LSM hook that allows attachment of BPF programs, declare a nop
>> * function where a BPF program can be attached.
>> */
>> @@ -30,6 +41,15 @@ noinline RET bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__) \
>> #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
>> #undef LSM_HOOK
>>
>> +#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, RET_FLAGS, NAME, ...) \
>> +noinline RET bpf_lsm_##NAME##_ret(int ret) \
>> +{ \
>> + return is_ret_value_allowed(ret, RET_FLAGS) ? ret : DEFAULT; \
>> +}
>> +
>> +#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
>> +#undef LSM_HOOK
>> +
>> #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, RET_FLAGS, NAME, ...) \
>> BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_##NAME)
>> BTF_SET_START(bpf_lsm_hooks)
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c
>> index 84b2d9dba79a..22485f0df534 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c
>> @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ int bpf_struct_ops_prepare_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_links *tlinks,
>> */
>> flags = model->ret_size > 0 ? BPF_TRAMP_F_RET_FENTRY_RET : 0;
>> return arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(NULL, image, image_end,
>> - model, flags, tlinks, NULL);
>> + model, flags, tlinks, NULL, NULL);
>> }
>>
>> static int bpf_struct_ops_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key,
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
>> index d6395215b849..3c6821b3c08c 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
>> @@ -464,7 +464,8 @@ static int bpf_trampoline_update(struct bpf_trampoline *tr, bool lock_direct_mut
>>
>> err = arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(im, im->image, im->image + PAGE_SIZE,
>> &tr->func.model, tr->flags, tlinks,
>> - tr->func.addr);
>> + tr->func.addr,
>> + tr->func.ret_check_addr);
>> if (err < 0)
>> goto out;
>>
>> @@ -802,6 +803,7 @@ struct bpf_trampoline *bpf_trampoline_get(u64 key,
>>
>> memcpy(&tr->func.model, &tgt_info->fmodel, sizeof(tgt_info->fmodel));
>> tr->func.addr = (void *)tgt_info->tgt_addr;
>> + tr->func.ret_check_addr = (void *)tgt_info->tgt_ret_check_addr;
>> out:
>> mutex_unlock(&tr->mutex);
>> return tr;
>> @@ -1055,7 +1057,7 @@ int __weak
>> arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *tr, void *image, void *image_end,
>> const struct btf_func_model *m, u32 flags,
>> struct bpf_tramp_links *tlinks,
>> - void *orig_call)
>> + void *orig_call, void *ret_check_call)
>> {
>> return -ENOTSUPP;
>> }
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> index 5e74f460dfd0..1ad0fe5cefe9 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> @@ -14988,12 +14988,13 @@ int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
>> {
>> bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT;
>> const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_";
>> - int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i;
>> + int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i, tname_len;
>> const struct btf_type *t;
>> bool conservative = true;
>> const char *tname;
>> + char *tname_ret;
>> struct btf *btf;
>> - long addr = 0;
>> + long addr = 0, ret_check_addr = 0;
>>
>> if (!btf_id) {
>> bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n");
>> @@ -15168,6 +15169,28 @@ int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
>> tname);
>> return -ENOENT;
>> }
>> +
>> + if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_MAC) {
>> + tname_len = strlen(tname);
>> + tname_ret = kmalloc(tname_len + 5, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!tname_ret) {
>> + bpf_log(log,
>> + "Cannot allocate memory for %s_ret string\n",
>> + tname);
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> + }
>> +
>> + snprintf(tname_ret, tname_len + 5, "%s_ret", tname);
>> + ret_check_addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname_ret);
>> + kfree(tname_ret);
>> +
>> + if (!ret_check_addr) {
>> + bpf_log(log,
>> + "Kernel symbol %s_ret not found\n",
>> + tname);
>> + return -ENOENT;
>> + }
>> + }
>> }
>>
>> if (prog->aux->sleepable) {
>> @@ -15210,6 +15233,7 @@ int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
>> break;
>> }
>> tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr;
>> + tgt_info->tgt_ret_check_addr = ret_check_addr;
>> tgt_info->tgt_name = tname;
>> tgt_info->tgt_type = t;
>> return 0;
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