[PoC][PATCH] bpf: Call return value check function in the JITed code
KP Singh
kpsingh at kernel.org
Wed Nov 16 19:02:57 UTC 2022
On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 6:12 PM Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> On 11/16/2022 7:47 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
> >
> > eBPF allows certain types of eBPF programs to modify the return value of
> > the functions they attach to. This is used for example by BPF LSM to let
> > security modules make their decision on LSM hooks.
> >
> > The JITed code looks like the following:
> >
> > ret = bpf_lsm_inode_permission_impl1(); // from a security module
> > if (ret)
> > goto out;
> >
> > ..
> >
> > ret = bpf_lsm_inode_permission_implN(); // from a security module
> > if (ret)
> > goto out;
> >
> > ret = bpf_lsm_inode_permission(); // in the kernel, returns DEFAULT
> > out:
> >
> > If ret is not zero, the attachment points of BPF LSM are not executed. For
> > this reason, the return value check cannot be done there.
> >
> > Instead, the idea is to use the LSM_HOOK() macro to define a per-hook check
> > function.
> >
> > Whenever an eBPF program attaches to an LSM hook, the eBPF verifier
> > resolves the address of the check function (whose name is
> > bpf_lsm_<hook name>_ret()) and adds a call to that function just after the
> > out label. If the return value is illegal, the check function changes it
> > back to the default value defined by the LSM infrastructure:
> >
> > ..
> >
> > out:
> > ret = bpf_lsm_inode_permission_ret(ret);
>
> As I've mentioned elsewhere, the return value is a small part of
> the problem you have with eBPF programs and the BPF LSM. Because
> the LSM infrastructure is inconsistent with regard to return codes,
> values returned in pointers and use of secids there is no uniform
> mechanism that I can see to address the "legitimate return" problem.
>
> Lets look at one of the ickyest interfaces we have, security_getprocattr().
> It returns the size of a string that it has allocated. It puts the
> pointer to the allocated buffer into a char **value that was passed to it.
> If bpf_getprocattr() returns a positive number and sets value to NULL Bad
> Things can happen. If the return value is greater than the size allocated
> ditto. If it returns an error but allocates a string you get a memory leak.
I think we should not need this hook in BPF. We can create a list of hooks that
we should not really expose via BPF.
>
> security_secid_to_secctx() has to work in concert with security_release_secctx()
> to do memory lifecycle management. If secid_to_secctx() allocates memory
> release_secctx() has to free it, while if secid_to_secctx() doesn't allocate
> memory it better not. (SELinux allocates memory, Smack does not. It's a real
> distinction) Your return checker would need to understand a lot more about
> the behavior of your eBPF programs than what value they return.
While this is possible to do using the BPF verifier (i.e. more detailed checks).
I don't see the value of BPF programs attaching to these hooks and we should
just not register the BPF LSM callbacks for these.
>
> >
> > In this way, an eBPF program cannot cause illegal return values to be sent
> > to BPF LSM, and to the callers of the LSM infrastructure.
> >
> > This is just a PoC, to validate the idea and get an early feedback.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu at huawei.com>
> > ---
> > arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 7 ++++---
> > arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
> > include/linux/bpf.h | 4 +++-
> > kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
> > kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c | 2 +-
> > kernel/bpf/trampoline.c | 6 ++++--
> > kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> > 7 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> > index 62f805f427b7..5412230c6935 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> > @@ -1764,7 +1764,7 @@ static void restore_args(struct jit_ctx *ctx, int args_off, int nargs)
> > */
> > static int prepare_trampoline(struct jit_ctx *ctx, struct bpf_tramp_image *im,
> > struct bpf_tramp_links *tlinks, void *orig_call,
> > - int nargs, u32 flags)
> > + void *ret_check_call, int nargs, u32 flags)
> > {
> > int i;
> > int stack_size;
> > @@ -1963,7 +1963,7 @@ static int prepare_trampoline(struct jit_ctx *ctx, struct bpf_tramp_image *im,
> > int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *image,
> > void *image_end, const struct btf_func_model *m,
> > u32 flags, struct bpf_tramp_links *tlinks,
> > - void *orig_call)
> > + void *orig_call, void *ret_check_call)
> > {
> > int i, ret;
> > int nargs = m->nr_args;
> > @@ -1983,7 +1983,8 @@ int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *image,
> > return -ENOTSUPP;
> > }
> >
> > - ret = prepare_trampoline(&ctx, im, tlinks, orig_call, nargs, flags);
> > + ret = prepare_trampoline(&ctx, im, tlinks, orig_call, ret_check_call,
> > + nargs, flags);
> > if (ret < 0)
> > return ret;
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> > index cec5195602bc..6cd727b4af0a 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> > @@ -2123,7 +2123,7 @@ static int invoke_bpf_mod_ret(const struct btf_func_model *m, u8 **pprog,
> > int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *image, void *image_end,
> > const struct btf_func_model *m, u32 flags,
> > struct bpf_tramp_links *tlinks,
> > - void *func_addr)
> > + void *func_addr, void *func_ret_check_addr)
> > {
> > int ret, i, nr_args = m->nr_args, extra_nregs = 0;
> > int regs_off, ip_off, args_off, stack_size = nr_args * 8, run_ctx_off;
> > @@ -2280,6 +2280,21 @@ int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *im, void *image, void *i
> > for (i = 0; i < fmod_ret->nr_links; i++)
> > emit_cond_near_jump(&branches[i], prog, branches[i],
> > X86_JNE);
> > +
> > + if (func_ret_check_addr) {
> > + emit_ldx(&prog, BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_FP, -8);
> > +
> > + /* call ret check function */
> > + if (emit_call(&prog, func_ret_check_addr, prog)) {
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + goto cleanup;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* remember return value in a stack for bpf prog to access */
> > + emit_stx(&prog, BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, BPF_REG_0, -8);
> > + memcpy(prog, x86_nops[5], X86_PATCH_SIZE);
> > + prog += X86_PATCH_SIZE;
> > + }
> > }
> >
> > if (fexit->nr_links)
> > diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
> > index 49f9d2bec401..f3551f7bdc28 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/bpf.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
> > @@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ struct bpf_tramp_image;
> > int arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *tr, void *image, void *image_end,
> > const struct btf_func_model *m, u32 flags,
> > struct bpf_tramp_links *tlinks,
> > - void *orig_call);
> > + void *orig_call, void *ret_call);
> > u64 notrace __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable_recur(struct bpf_prog *prog,
> > struct bpf_tramp_run_ctx *run_ctx);
> > void notrace __bpf_prog_exit_sleepable_recur(struct bpf_prog *prog, u64 start,
> > @@ -974,6 +974,7 @@ struct bpf_trampoline {
> > struct {
> > struct btf_func_model model;
> > void *addr;
> > + void *ret_check_addr;
> > bool ftrace_managed;
> > } func;
> > /* if !NULL this is BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT program that extends another BPF
> > @@ -994,6 +995,7 @@ struct bpf_trampoline {
> > struct bpf_attach_target_info {
> > struct btf_func_model fmodel;
> > long tgt_addr;
> > + long tgt_ret_check_addr;
> > const char *tgt_name;
> > const struct btf_type *tgt_type;
> > };
> > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> > index 37bcedf5a44e..f7f25d0064dd 100644
> > --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> > +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> > @@ -18,6 +18,17 @@
> > #include <linux/ima.h>
> > #include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h>
> >
> > +static bool is_ret_value_allowed(int ret, u32 ret_flags)
> > +{
> > + if ((ret < 0 && !(ret_flags & LSM_RET_NEG)) ||
> > + (ret == 0 && !(ret_flags & LSM_RET_ZERO)) ||
> > + (ret == 1 && !(ret_flags & LSM_RET_ONE)) ||
> > + (ret > 1 && !(ret_flags & LSM_RET_GT_ONE)))
> > + return false;
> > +
> > + return true;
> > +}
> > +
> > /* For every LSM hook that allows attachment of BPF programs, declare a nop
> > * function where a BPF program can be attached.
> > */
> > @@ -30,6 +41,15 @@ noinline RET bpf_lsm_##NAME(__VA_ARGS__) \
> > #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
> > #undef LSM_HOOK
> >
> > +#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, RET_FLAGS, NAME, ...) \
> > +noinline RET bpf_lsm_##NAME##_ret(int ret) \
> > +{ \
> > + return is_ret_value_allowed(ret, RET_FLAGS) ? ret : DEFAULT; \
> > +}
> > +
> > +#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
> > +#undef LSM_HOOK
> > +
> > #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, RET_FLAGS, NAME, ...) \
> > BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_##NAME)
> > BTF_SET_START(bpf_lsm_hooks)
> > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c
> > index 84b2d9dba79a..22485f0df534 100644
> > --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c
> > +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c
> > @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ int bpf_struct_ops_prepare_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_links *tlinks,
> > */
> > flags = model->ret_size > 0 ? BPF_TRAMP_F_RET_FENTRY_RET : 0;
> > return arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(NULL, image, image_end,
> > - model, flags, tlinks, NULL);
> > + model, flags, tlinks, NULL, NULL);
> > }
> >
> > static int bpf_struct_ops_map_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key,
> > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
> > index d6395215b849..3c6821b3c08c 100644
> > --- a/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
> > +++ b/kernel/bpf/trampoline.c
> > @@ -464,7 +464,8 @@ static int bpf_trampoline_update(struct bpf_trampoline *tr, bool lock_direct_mut
> >
> > err = arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(im, im->image, im->image + PAGE_SIZE,
> > &tr->func.model, tr->flags, tlinks,
> > - tr->func.addr);
> > + tr->func.addr,
> > + tr->func.ret_check_addr);
> > if (err < 0)
> > goto out;
> >
> > @@ -802,6 +803,7 @@ struct bpf_trampoline *bpf_trampoline_get(u64 key,
> >
> > memcpy(&tr->func.model, &tgt_info->fmodel, sizeof(tgt_info->fmodel));
> > tr->func.addr = (void *)tgt_info->tgt_addr;
> > + tr->func.ret_check_addr = (void *)tgt_info->tgt_ret_check_addr;
> > out:
> > mutex_unlock(&tr->mutex);
> > return tr;
> > @@ -1055,7 +1057,7 @@ int __weak
> > arch_prepare_bpf_trampoline(struct bpf_tramp_image *tr, void *image, void *image_end,
> > const struct btf_func_model *m, u32 flags,
> > struct bpf_tramp_links *tlinks,
> > - void *orig_call)
> > + void *orig_call, void *ret_check_call)
> > {
> > return -ENOTSUPP;
> > }
> > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > index 5e74f460dfd0..1ad0fe5cefe9 100644
> > --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> > @@ -14988,12 +14988,13 @@ int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
> > {
> > bool prog_extension = prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT;
> > const char prefix[] = "btf_trace_";
> > - int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i;
> > + int ret = 0, subprog = -1, i, tname_len;
> > const struct btf_type *t;
> > bool conservative = true;
> > const char *tname;
> > + char *tname_ret;
> > struct btf *btf;
> > - long addr = 0;
> > + long addr = 0, ret_check_addr = 0;
> >
> > if (!btf_id) {
> > bpf_log(log, "Tracing programs must provide btf_id\n");
> > @@ -15168,6 +15169,28 @@ int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
> > tname);
> > return -ENOENT;
> > }
> > +
> > + if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_MAC) {
> > + tname_len = strlen(tname);
> > + tname_ret = kmalloc(tname_len + 5, GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!tname_ret) {
> > + bpf_log(log,
> > + "Cannot allocate memory for %s_ret string\n",
> > + tname);
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > + }
> > +
> > + snprintf(tname_ret, tname_len + 5, "%s_ret", tname);
> > + ret_check_addr = kallsyms_lookup_name(tname_ret);
> > + kfree(tname_ret);
> > +
> > + if (!ret_check_addr) {
> > + bpf_log(log,
> > + "Kernel symbol %s_ret not found\n",
> > + tname);
> > + return -ENOENT;
> > + }
> > + }
> > }
> >
> > if (prog->aux->sleepable) {
> > @@ -15210,6 +15233,7 @@ int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
> > break;
> > }
> > tgt_info->tgt_addr = addr;
> > + tgt_info->tgt_ret_check_addr = ret_check_addr;
> > tgt_info->tgt_name = tname;
> > tgt_info->tgt_type = t;
> > return 0;
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