[PATCH v2] fs: don't audit the capability check in simple_xattr_list()

[Christian Brauner]

On Sat, Nov 05, 2022 at 12:38:57AM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 3, 2022 at 11:13 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > The check being unconditional may lead to unwanted denials reported by
> > LSMs when a process has the capability granted by DAC, but denied by an
> > LSM. In the case of SELinux such denials are a problem, since they can't
> > be effectively filtered out via the policy and when not silenced, they
> > produce noise that may hide a true problem or an attack.
> >
> > Checking for the capability only if any trusted xattr is actually
> > present wouldn't really address the issue, since calling listxattr(2) on
> > such node on its own doesn't indicate an explicit attempt to see the
> > trusted xattrs. Additionally, it could potentially leak the presence of
> > trusted xattrs to an unprivileged user if they can check for the denials
> > (e.g. through dmesg).
> >
> > Therefore, it's best (and simplest) to keep the check unconditional and
> > instead use ns_capable_noaudit() that will silence any associated LSM
> > denials.
> >
> > Fixes: 38f38657444d ("xattr: extract simple_xattr code from tmpfs")
> > Reported-by: Martin Pitt <mpitt at redhat.com>
> > Suggested-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner at kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat.com>
> > ---
> >
> > v1 -> v2: switch to simpler and better solution as suggested by Christian
> >
> > v1: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAFqZXNuC7c0Ukx_okYZ7rsKycQY5P1zpMPmmq_T5Qyzbg-x7yQ@mail.gmail.com/T/
> >
> >  fs/xattr.c | 2 +-
> >  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> VFS folks, this should really go through a vfs tree, but if nobody
> wants to pick it up *and* there are no objections to the change, I can
> take this via the LSM tree.

I can pick this up as I'm currently massaging the simple xattr
infrastructure. I think the fix is pretty straightforward otherwise.

Christian