[PATCH v2] fs: don't audit the capability check in simple_xattr_list()

[Paul Moore]

On Thu, Nov 3, 2022 at 11:13 AM Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat.com> wrote:
>
> The check being unconditional may lead to unwanted denials reported by
> LSMs when a process has the capability granted by DAC, but denied by an
> LSM. In the case of SELinux such denials are a problem, since they can't
> be effectively filtered out via the policy and when not silenced, they
> produce noise that may hide a true problem or an attack.
>
> Checking for the capability only if any trusted xattr is actually
> present wouldn't really address the issue, since calling listxattr(2) on
> such node on its own doesn't indicate an explicit attempt to see the
> trusted xattrs. Additionally, it could potentially leak the presence of
> trusted xattrs to an unprivileged user if they can check for the denials
> (e.g. through dmesg).
>
> Therefore, it's best (and simplest) to keep the check unconditional and
> instead use ns_capable_noaudit() that will silence any associated LSM
> denials.
>
> Fixes: 38f38657444d ("xattr: extract simple_xattr code from tmpfs")
> Reported-by: Martin Pitt <mpitt at redhat.com>
> Suggested-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner at kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat.com>
> ---
>
> v1 -> v2: switch to simpler and better solution as suggested by Christian
>
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAFqZXNuC7c0Ukx_okYZ7rsKycQY5P1zpMPmmq_T5Qyzbg-x7yQ@mail.gmail.com/T/
>
>  fs/xattr.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

VFS folks, this should really go through a vfs tree, but if nobody
wants to pick it up *and* there are no objections to the change, I can
take this via the LSM tree.

Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com>

-- 
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