[PATCH v19 0/4] overlayfs override_creds=off & nested get xattr fix
Paul Moore
paul at paul-moore.com
Fri Mar 11 20:52:54 UTC 2022
On Fri, Mar 11, 2022 at 9:01 AM Vivek Goyal <vgoyal at redhat.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 11, 2022 at 06:09:56AM +0200, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> > Hi Paul,
Hi Amir, Vivek,
Thanks for the replies, I think I now have a better understanding of
the concerns which is starting to make the path forward a bit more
clear. A few more comments below ...
> > In this thread I claimed that the authors of the patches did not present
> > a security model for overlayfs, such as the one currently in overlayfs.rst.
> > If we had a model we could have debated its correctness and review its
> > implementation.
>
> Agreed. After going through the patch set, I was wondering what's the
> overall security model and how to visualize that.
>
> So probably there needs to be a documentation patch which explains
> what's the new security model and how does it work.
Yes, of course. I'll be sure to add a section to the existing docs.
> Also think both in terms of DAC and MAC. (Instead of just focussing too
> hard on SELinux).
Definitely. Most of what I've been thinking about the past day or so
has been how to properly handle some of the DAC/capability issues; I
have yet to start playing with the code, but for the most part I think
the MAC/SELinux bits are already working properly.
> My understanding is that in current model, some of the overlayfs
> operations require priviliges. So mounter is supposed to be priviliged
> and does the operation on underlying layers.
>
> Now in this new model, there will be two levels of check. Both overlay
> level and underlying layer checks will happen in the context of task
> which is doing the operation. So first of all, all tasks will need
> to have enough priviliges to be able to perform various operations
> on lower layer.
>
> If we do checks at both the levels in with the creds of calling task,
> I guess that probably is fine. (But will require a closer code inspection
> to make sure there is no privilege escalation both for mounter as well
> calling task).
I have thoughts on this, but I don't think I'm yet in a position to
debate this in depth just yet; I still need to finish poking around
the code and playing with a few things :)
It may take some time before I'm back with patches, but I appreciate
all of the tips and insight - thank you!
--
paul-moore.com
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