[PATCH RESEND] xfs: don't generate selinux audit messages for capability testing
Darrick J. Wong
djwong at kernel.org
Tue Mar 1 02:50:52 UTC 2022
From: Darrick J. Wong <djwong at kernel.org>
There are a few places where we test the current process' capability set
to decide if we're going to be more or less generous with resource
acquisition for a system call. If the process doesn't have the
capability, we can continue the call, albeit in a degraded mode.
These are /not/ the actual security decisions, so it's not proper to use
capable(), which (in certain selinux setups) causes audit messages to
get logged. Switch them to has_capability_noaudit.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong at kernel.org>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david at fromorbit.com>
---
fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c | 4 ++--
fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c | 2 +-
fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c | 2 +-
kernel/capability.c | 1 +
4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c
index 48287caad28b..10e1cb71439e 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c
@@ -864,8 +864,8 @@ xfs_getfsmap(
!xfs_getfsmap_is_valid_device(mp, &head->fmh_keys[1]))
return -EINVAL;
- use_rmap = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
- xfs_has_rmapbt(mp);
+ use_rmap = xfs_has_rmapbt(mp) &&
+ has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
head->fmh_entries = 0;
/* Set up our device handlers. */
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
index 2515fe8299e1..83481005317a 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_ioctl.c
@@ -1189,7 +1189,7 @@ xfs_ioctl_setattr_get_trans(
goto out_error;
error = xfs_trans_alloc_ichange(ip, NULL, NULL, pdqp,
- capable(CAP_FOWNER), &tp);
+ has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_FOWNER), &tp);
if (error)
goto out_error;
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c
index b79b3846e71b..a65217f787cf 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c
@@ -723,7 +723,7 @@ xfs_setattr_nonsize(
}
error = xfs_trans_alloc_ichange(ip, udqp, gdqp, NULL,
- capable(CAP_FOWNER), &tp);
+ has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_FOWNER), &tp);
if (error)
goto out_dqrele;
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 46a361dde042..765194f5d678 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
{
return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(has_capability_noaudit);
static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap,
More information about the Linux-security-module-archive
mailing list