[PATCH][V2] security: keys: trusted: Fix memory leaks on allocated blob

[Colin King]

From: Colin Ian King <colin.king at canonical.com>

There are several error return paths that don't kfree the allocated
blob, leading to memory leaks. Ensure blob is initialized to null as
some of the error return paths in function tpm2_key_decode do not
change blob. Add an error return path to kfree blob and use this on
the current leaky returns.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Resource leak")
Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")
Acked-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg at linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king at canonical.com>

---

V2: Add a couple more leaky return path fixes as noted by Sumit Garg
    Add the if (blob != payload->blob) check on the kfree as
    noted by Dan Carpenter

---
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 0165da386289..a2cfdfdf17fa 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 	unsigned int private_len;
 	unsigned int public_len;
 	unsigned int blob_len;
-	u8 *blob, *pub;
+	u8 *blob = NULL, *pub;
 	int rc;
 	u32 attrs;
 
@@ -378,22 +378,30 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 	}
 
 	/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
-	if (!options->keyhandle)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!options->keyhandle) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
+	}
 
 	/* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
-	if (payload->blob_len < 4)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	if (payload->blob_len < 4) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
+	}
 
 	private_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob);
 
 	/* must be big enough for following public_len */
-	if (private_len + 2 + 2 > (payload->blob_len))
-		return -E2BIG;
+	if (private_len + 2 + 2 > (payload->blob_len)) {
+		rc = -E2BIG;
+		goto err;
+	}
 
 	public_len = get_unaligned_be16(blob + 2 + private_len);
-	if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len)
-		return -E2BIG;
+	if (private_len + 2 + public_len + 2 > payload->blob_len) {
+		rc = -E2BIG;
+		goto err;
+	}
 
 	pub = blob + 2 + private_len + 2;
 	/* key attributes are always at offset 4 */
@@ -406,12 +414,14 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 		payload->migratable = 1;
 
 	blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4;
-	if (blob_len > payload->blob_len)
-		return -E2BIG;
+	if (blob_len > payload->blob_len) {
+		rc = -E2BIG;
+		goto err;
+	}
 
 	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
 	if (rc)
-		return rc;
+		goto err;
 
 	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle);
 	tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW,
@@ -441,6 +451,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 		rc = -EPERM;
 
 	return rc;
+
+err:
+	if (blob != payload->blob)
+		kfree(blob);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
-- 
2.31.1