[PATCH] security: keys: trusted: Fix memory leaks on allocated blob
Colin Ian King
colin.king at canonical.com
Mon Jul 26 10:56:36 UTC 2021
On 26/07/2021 09:50, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 23, 2021 at 06:21:21PM +0100, Colin King wrote:
>> @@ -441,6 +449,10 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>> rc = -EPERM;
>>
>> return rc;
>> +
>> +err:
>> + kfree(blob);
>
> This needs to be:
>
> if (blob != payload->blob)
> kfree(blob);
Good spot! Thanks Dan.
>
> Otherwise it leads to a use after free.
>
>> + return rc;
>> }
>
> How this is allocated is pretty scary looking!
it is kinda mind bending.
Colin
>
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> 96 static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
> 97 struct trusted_key_options *options,
> 98 u8 **buf)
> 99 {
> 100 int ret;
> 101 struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
> 102 u8 *blob;
> 103
> 104 memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
> 105
> 106 ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&tpm2key_decoder, &ctx, payload->blob,
> 107 payload->blob_len);
> 108 if (ret < 0)
> 109 return ret;
>
> Old form?
>
> 110
> 111 if (ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE)
> 112 return -EINVAL;
>
> It's really scary to me that if the lengths are too large for kmalloc()
> then we just use "payload->blob".
>
> 113
> 114 blob = kmalloc(ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len + 4, GFP_KERNEL);
>
> blob is allocated here.
>
> 115 if (!blob)
> 116 return -ENOMEM;
> 117
> 118 *buf = blob;
> 119 options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
> 120
> 121 memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
> 122 blob += ctx.priv_len;
> 123
> 124 memcpy(blob, ctx.pub, ctx.pub_len);
> 125
> 126 return 0;
> 127 }
>
> [ snip ]
>
> 371 u32 attrs;
> 372
> 373 rc = tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob);
> 374 if (rc) {
> 375 /* old form */
> 376 blob = payload->blob;
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>
> 377 payload->old_format = 1;
> 378 }
> 379
>
> regards,
> dan carpenter
>
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