[PATCH] ima: fix deadlock when traversing "ima_default_rules".
liqiong
liqiong at nfschina.com
Fri Aug 27 10:35:36 UTC 2021
The current IMA ruleset is identified by the variable "ima_rules"
that default to "&ima_default_rules". When loading a custom policy
for the first time, the variable is updated to "&ima_policy_rules"
instead. That update isn't RCU-safe, and deadlocks are possible.
Indeed, some functions like ima_match_policy() may loop indefinitely
when traversing "ima_default_rules" with list_for_each_entry_rcu().
When iterating over the default ruleset back to head, if the list
head is "ima_default_rules", and "ima_rules" have been updated to
"&ima_policy_rules", the loop condition (&entry->list != ima_rules)
stays always true, traversing won't terminate, causing a soft lockup
and RCU stalls.
Introduce a temporary value for "ima_rules" when iterating over
the ruleset to avoid the deadlocks.
Signed-off-by: liqiong <liqiong at nfschina.com>
Reviewed-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY at viveris.fr>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index fd5d46e511f1..e92b197bfd3c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -662,12 +662,14 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
+ struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
if (template_desc && !*template_desc)
*template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
+ ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
if (!(entry->action & actmask))
continue;
@@ -919,8 +921,8 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
if (ima_rules != policy) {
ima_policy_flag = 0;
- ima_rules = policy;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ima_rules, policy);
/*
* IMA architecture specific policy rules are specified
* as strings and converted to an array of ima_entry_rules
@@ -1649,9 +1651,11 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
loff_t l = *pos;
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+ struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
+ ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
if (!l--) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return entry;
@@ -1670,7 +1674,8 @@ void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
rcu_read_unlock();
(*pos)++;
- return (&entry->list == ima_rules) ? NULL : entry;
+ return (&entry->list == &ima_default_rules ||
+ &entry->list == &ima_policy_rules) ? NULL : entry;
}
void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
@@ -1872,6 +1877,7 @@ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
bool found = false;
enum ima_hooks func;
+ struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
if (id >= READING_MAX_ID)
return false;
@@ -1879,7 +1885,8 @@ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
+ ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
if (entry->action != APPRAISE)
continue;
--
2.11.0
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