[PATCH] ima: fix deadlock within RCU list of ima_rules
THOBY Simon
Simon.THOBY at viveris.fr
Fri Aug 27 09:20:48 UTC 2021
On 8/27/21 11:10 AM, liqiong wrote:
> Hi Simon,
>
> Thanks for your patient, i learn a lot. If the commit message
> does work, i would resubmit the patch. Here is the whole patch:
>
>
> The current IMA ruleset is identified by the variable "ima_rules"
> that default to "&ima_default_rules". When loading a custom policy
> for the first time, the variable is updated to "&ima_policy_rules"
> instead. That update isn't RCU-safe, and deadlocks are possible.
> Indeed, some functions like ima_match_policy() may loop indefinitely
> when traversing "ima_default_rules" with list_for_each_entry_rcu().
>
> When iterating over the default ruleset back to head, if the list
> head is "ima_default_rules", and "ima_rules" have been updated to
> "&ima_policy_rules", the loop condition (&entry->list != ima_rules)
> stays always true, traversing won't terminate, causing a soft lockup
> and RCU stalls.
>
> Introduce a temporary value for "ima_rules" when iterating over
> the ruleset to avoid the deadlocks.
>
> Signed-off-by: liqiong <liqiong at nfschina.com>
> ---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 17 ++++++++++++-----
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index fd5d46e511f1..e92b197bfd3c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -662,12 +662,14 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
> {
> struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
> int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
> + struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
>
> if (template_desc && !*template_desc)
> *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
>
> rcu_read_lock();
> - list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
> + ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
> + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
>
> if (!(entry->action & actmask))
> continue;
> @@ -919,8 +921,8 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
>
> if (ima_rules != policy) {
> ima_policy_flag = 0;
> - ima_rules = policy;
>
> + rcu_assign_pointer(ima_rules, policy);
> /*
> * IMA architecture specific policy rules are specified
> * as strings and converted to an array of ima_entry_rules
> @@ -1649,9 +1651,11 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
> {
> loff_t l = *pos;
> struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
> + struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
>
> rcu_read_lock();
> - list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
> + ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
> + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
> if (!l--) {
> rcu_read_unlock();
> return entry;
> @@ -1670,7 +1674,8 @@ void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
> rcu_read_unlock();
> (*pos)++;
>
> - return (&entry->list == ima_rules) ? NULL : entry;
> + return (&entry->list == &ima_default_rules ||
> + &entry->list == &ima_policy_rules) ? NULL : entry;
> }
>
> void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> @@ -1872,6 +1877,7 @@ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
> bool found = false;
> enum ima_hooks func;
> + struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
>
> if (id >= READING_MAX_ID)
> return false;
> @@ -1879,7 +1885,8 @@ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
>
> rcu_read_lock();
> - list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
> + ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
> + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
> if (entry->action != APPRAISE)
> continue;
>
>
Reviewed-By: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY at viveris.fr>
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