[PATCH bpf-next v4 3/7] bpf: Introduce BPF_MODIFY_RETURN
casey at schaufler-ca.com
Thu Mar 5 18:47:10 UTC 2020
On 3/5/2020 10:03 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 12:35 PM Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> I believe that I have stated that order isn't my issue.
>> Go first, last or as specified in the lsm list, I really
>> don't care. We'll talk about what does matter in the KRSI
> Order matters when the security module logic (in this case, the BPF
> program) is loaded from userspace and
> the userspace process isn't already required to be fully privileged
> with respect to the in-kernel security modules.
> CAP_MAC_ADMIN was their (not unreasonable) attempt to check that
> requirement; it just doesn't happen to convey
> the same meaning for SELinux since SELinux predates the introduction
> of CAP_MAC_ADMIN (in Linux at least) and
> since SELinux was designed to confine even processes with capabilities.
If KRSI "needs" to go last, I'm fine with that. What I continue
to object to is making KRSI/BPF a special case in the code. It
doesn't need to be.
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