[PATCH bpf-next v4 3/7] bpf: Introduce BPF_MODIFY_RETURN
stephen.smalley.work at gmail.com
Thu Mar 5 18:03:26 UTC 2020
On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 12:35 PM Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> I believe that I have stated that order isn't my issue.
> Go first, last or as specified in the lsm list, I really
> don't care. We'll talk about what does matter in the KRSI
Order matters when the security module logic (in this case, the BPF
program) is loaded from userspace and
the userspace process isn't already required to be fully privileged
with respect to the in-kernel security modules.
CAP_MAC_ADMIN was their (not unreasonable) attempt to check that
requirement; it just doesn't happen to convey
the same meaning for SELinux since SELinux predates the introduction
of CAP_MAC_ADMIN (in Linux at least) and
since SELinux was designed to confine even processes with capabilities.
> Then I'm fine with using the LSM ordering mechanisms that Kees
> thought through to run the BPF last. Although I think it's somewhat
> concerning that SELinux cares what other security models might be
> in place. If BPF programs can violate SELinux (or traditional DAC)
> policies there are bigger issues than ordering.
It is only safe for Smack because CAP_MAC_ADMIN already conveys all
privileges with respect to Smack.
Otherwise, the BPF program can access information about the object
attributes, e.g. inode attributes,
and leak that information to userspace even if SELinux would have
denied the process that loaded the BPF
program permissions to directly obtain that information. This is also
why Landlock has to be last in the LSM list.
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