[PATCH 2/4] fs: Remove FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER from kernel_read_file() enums
Scott Branden
scott.branden at broadcom.com
Tue Jul 7 16:42:02 UTC 2020
On 2020-07-07 1:19 a.m., Kees Cook wrote:
> FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER is a "how", not a "what", and confuses the LSMs
> that are interested in filtering between types of things. The "how"
> should be an internal detail made uninteresting to the LSMs.
>
> Fixes: a098ecd2fa7d ("firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer")
> Fixes: fd90bc559bfb ("ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)")
> Fixes: 4f0496d8ffa3 ("ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)")
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
> ---
> drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 5 ++---
> fs/exec.c | 7 ++++---
> include/linux/fs.h | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 ++----
> 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
> index ca871b13524e..c2f57cedcd6f 100644
> --- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
> @@ -465,14 +465,12 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
> int i, len;
> int rc = -ENOENT;
> char *path;
> - enum kernel_read_file_id id = READING_FIRMWARE;
> size_t msize = INT_MAX;
> void *buffer = NULL;
>
> /* Already populated data member means we're loading into a buffer */
> if (!decompress && fw_priv->data) {
> buffer = fw_priv->data;
> - id = READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER;
> msize = fw_priv->allocated_size;
> }
>
> @@ -496,7 +494,8 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
>
> /* load firmware files from the mount namespace of init */
> rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer,
> - &size, msize, id);
> + &size, msize,
> + READING_FIRMWARE);
> if (rc) {
> if (rc != -ENOENT)
> dev_warn(device, "loading %s failed with error %d\n",
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index e6e8a9a70327..2bf549757ce7 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -927,6 +927,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> {
> loff_t i_size, pos;
> ssize_t bytes = 0;
> + void *allocated = NULL;
> int ret;
>
> if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
> @@ -950,8 +951,8 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> goto out;
> }
>
> - if (id != READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER)
> - *buf = vmalloc(i_size);
> + if (!*buf)
> + *buf = allocated = vmalloc(i_size);
> if (!*buf) {
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> goto out;
> @@ -980,7 +981,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
>
> out_free:
> if (ret < 0) {
> - if (id != READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER) {
> + if (allocated) {
> vfree(*buf);
> *buf = NULL;
> }
> diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
> index 3f881a892ea7..95fc775ed937 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
> @@ -2993,10 +2993,10 @@ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
> #endif
> extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
>
> +/* This is a list of *what* is being read, not *how*. */
> #define __kernel_read_file_id(id) \
> id(UNKNOWN, unknown) \
> id(FIRMWARE, firmware) \
With this change, I'm trying to figure out how the partial firmware read
is going to work on top of this reachitecture.
Is it going to be ok to add READING_PARTIAL_FIRMWARE here as that is a
"what"?
> - id(FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER, firmware) \
My patch series gets rejected any time I make a change to the
kernel_read_file* region in linux/fs.h.
The requirement is for this api to move to another header file outside
of linux/fs.h
It seems the same should apply to your change.
Could you please add the following patch to the start of you patch
series to move the kernel_read_file* to its own include file?
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11647063/
> id(FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED, firmware) \
> id(MODULE, kernel-module) \
> id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image) \
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index c1583d98c5e5..f80ee4ce4669 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -611,19 +611,17 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
> int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
> {
> /*
> - * READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER
> - *
> * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
> * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion
> * of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two
> - * buffers?
> + * buffers? It may be desirable to include the buffer address
> + * in this API and walk all the dma_map_single() mappings to check.
> */
> return 0;
> }
>
> const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
> [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> - [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
> [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
> [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
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