[PATCH 2/4] fs: Remove FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER from kernel_read_file() enums

Kees Cook keescook at chromium.org
Tue Jul 7 08:19:24 UTC 2020


FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER is a "how", not a "what", and confuses the LSMs
that are interested in filtering between types of things. The "how"
should be an internal detail made uninteresting to the LSMs.

Fixes: a098ecd2fa7d ("firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer")
Fixes: fd90bc559bfb ("ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)")
Fixes: 4f0496d8ffa3 ("ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
---
 drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 5 ++---
 fs/exec.c                           | 7 ++++---
 include/linux/fs.h                  | 2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c   | 6 ++----
 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
index ca871b13524e..c2f57cedcd6f 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
@@ -465,14 +465,12 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
 	int i, len;
 	int rc = -ENOENT;
 	char *path;
-	enum kernel_read_file_id id = READING_FIRMWARE;
 	size_t msize = INT_MAX;
 	void *buffer = NULL;
 
 	/* Already populated data member means we're loading into a buffer */
 	if (!decompress && fw_priv->data) {
 		buffer = fw_priv->data;
-		id = READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER;
 		msize = fw_priv->allocated_size;
 	}
 
@@ -496,7 +494,8 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
 
 		/* load firmware files from the mount namespace of init */
 		rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer,
-						       &size, msize, id);
+						       &size, msize,
+						       READING_FIRMWARE);
 		if (rc) {
 			if (rc != -ENOENT)
 				dev_warn(device, "loading %s failed with error %d\n",
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index e6e8a9a70327..2bf549757ce7 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -927,6 +927,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
 {
 	loff_t i_size, pos;
 	ssize_t bytes = 0;
+	void *allocated = NULL;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
@@ -950,8 +951,8 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (id != READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER)
-		*buf = vmalloc(i_size);
+	if (!*buf)
+		*buf = allocated = vmalloc(i_size);
 	if (!*buf) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
@@ -980,7 +981,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
 
 out_free:
 	if (ret < 0) {
-		if (id != READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER) {
+		if (allocated) {
 			vfree(*buf);
 			*buf = NULL;
 		}
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 3f881a892ea7..95fc775ed937 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2993,10 +2993,10 @@ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
 #endif
 extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
 
+/* This is a list of *what* is being read, not *how*. */
 #define __kernel_read_file_id(id) \
 	id(UNKNOWN, unknown)		\
 	id(FIRMWARE, firmware)		\
-	id(FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER, firmware)	\
 	id(FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED, firmware)	\
 	id(MODULE, kernel-module)		\
 	id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image)		\
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index c1583d98c5e5..f80ee4ce4669 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -611,19 +611,17 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
 int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
 	/*
-	 * READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER
-	 *
 	 * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
 	 * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion
 	 * of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two
-	 * buffers?
+	 * buffers? It may be desirable to include the buffer address
+	 * in this API and walk all the dma_map_single() mappings to check.
 	 */
 	return 0;
 }
 
 const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
 	[READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
-	[READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
 	[READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
 	[READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
 	[READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
-- 
2.25.1



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