[PATCH v10 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
Casey Schaufler
casey at schaufler-ca.com
Tue Oct 29 15:51:20 UTC 2019
On 10/29/2019 7:53 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 10/24/19 4:52 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> This patchset provides the changes required for
>> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
>>
>> v10: Ask the security modules if the display can be changed.
>>
>> v9: There is no version 9
>>
>> v8: Incorporate feedback from v7
>> - Minor clean-up in display value management
>> - refactor "compound" context creation to use a common
>> append_ctx() function.
>>
>> v7: Incorporate feedback from v6
>> - Make setting the display a privileged operation. The
>> availability of compound contexts reduces the need for
>> setting the display.
>>
>> v6: Incorporate feedback from v5
>> - Add subj_<lsm>= and obj_<lsm>= fields to audit records
>> - Add /proc/.../attr/context to get the full context in
>> lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie
>> - Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for getsockopt() to get the full context
>> in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie.
>> - Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_default to provide
>> the display default value.
>>
>> v5: Incorporate feedback from v4
>> - Initialize the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx()
>> - Clear the lsmcontext in all security_release_secctx() cases
>> - Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context
>> interfaces.
>> - The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context
>> "display" isn't compatible with SELinux.
>>
>> v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
>> - Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
>> - Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list
>> with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The
>> LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the
>> lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the
>> slot value.
>> - Validate slot values used in security.c
>> - Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that
>> it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
>> - fix display value check in dentry_init_security
>> - Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting
>> the audit log
>>
>> v3: Incorporate feedback from v2
>> - Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more
>> meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob".
>> - Improve consistency of constant naming.
>> - Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization.
>> - Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding.
>> - Rather than clutter security_getpeersec_dgram with
>> otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor
>> stub, which does nothing useful.
>>
>> Patche 0001 moves management of the sock security blob from the individual
>> modules to the infrastructure.
>>
>> Patches 0002-0012 replace system use of a "secid" with
>> a structure "lsmblob" containing information from the
>> security modules to be held and reused later. At this
>> point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot"
>> for each of the security modules compiled into the
>> kernel that used secids. A "slot" is allocated when
>> a security module requests one.
>> The infrastructure is changed to use the slot number
>> to pass the correct secid to or from the security module
>> hooks.
>>
>> It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity
>> that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places
>> where it is used would have performance and/or locking
>> issues with dynamic allocation.
>>
>> Patch 0013 provides a mechanism for a process to
>> identify which security module's hooks should be used
>> when displaying or converting a security context string.
>> A new interface /proc/.../attr/display contains the name
>> of the security module to show. Reading from this file
>> will present the name of the module, while writing to
>> it will set the value. Only names of active security
>> modules are accepted. Internally, the name is translated
>> to the appropriate "slot" number for the module which
>> is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the
>> display requires that all modules using the /proc interfaces
>> allow the transition.
>>
>> Patch 0014 Starts the process of changing how a security
>> context is represented. Since it is possible for a
>> security context to have been generated by more than one
>> security module it is now necessary to note which module
>> created a security context so that the correct "release"
>> hook can be called. There are several places where the
>> module that created a security context cannot be inferred.
>>
>> This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure
>> which contains the context string, its length and the
>> "slot" number of the security module that created it.
>> The security_release_secctx() interface is changed,
>> replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext
>> pointer.
>>
>> Patches 0015-0017 convert the security interfaces from
>> (string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer.
>> The slot number identifying the creating module is
>> added by the infrastructure. Where the security context
>> is stored for extended periods the data type is changed.
>>
>> The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures
>> instead of secids in Patches 0018-0019.
>>
>> Patch 0020 adds checks to the binder hooks which verify
>> that if both ends of a transaction use the same "display".
>>
>> Patches 0021-0022 add addition data to the audit records
>> to identify the LSM specific data for all active modules.
>>
>> Patches 0023-0024 add new interfaces for getting the
>> compound security contexts.
>>
>> Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks
>> removed, Patch 0025 removes the exclusive bit from
>> AppArmor. An unnecessary stub hook was also removed.
>>
>> The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of
>> this patchset in their distribution to enable stacking
>> for containers.
>>
>> Performance measurements to date have the change
>> within the "noise". The sockperf and dbench results
>> are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8% difference, with
>> better performance being as common as worse. The
>> benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu.
>>
>> https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v10-apparmor
>
> Can you re-base on something more recent than v5.1-rc2 (that's the base for that branch currently)?
> At present it won't even boot for me on modern Fedora. Two key missing commits are:
Sigh. It's based on James' next-general. As it's going up through James,
and he hasn't updated that branch, I'm sort of stuck. BTW, I have a re-based
version, but don't see how to get it into my git tree without mucking up
the eventual merge.
>
> e33c1b9923775d17ad246946fe67fcb9be288677 ("apparmor: Restore Y/N in /sys for apparmor's "enabled") - without this, dbus falls over (or at least dbus-broker in Fedora)
>
> 169ce0c081cd85f78388bb6c1638c1ad7b81bde7 ("selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob") - without this, selinux ends up dereferencing something other than its own security blob after these patches
>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey at schaufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>> arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 +
>> arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 +
>> arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 +
>> arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 1 +
>> drivers/android/binder.c | 24 +-
>> fs/kernfs/dir.c | 5 +-
>> fs/kernfs/inode.c | 35 +-
>> fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 3 +-
>> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 22 +-
>> fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 20 +-
>> fs/proc/base.c | 2 +
>> include/linux/audit.h | 1 +
>> include/linux/cred.h | 3 +-
>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 37 +-
>> include/linux/security.h | 175 ++++++++--
>> include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +-
>> include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +-
>> include/net/scm.h | 15 +-
>> include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h | 1 +
>> kernel/audit.c | 70 +++-
>> kernel/audit.h | 9 +-
>> kernel/audit_fsnotify.c | 1 +
>> kernel/auditfilter.c | 10 +-
>> kernel/auditsc.c | 129 ++++---
>> kernel/cred.c | 12 +-
>> net/core/sock.c | 7 +-
>> net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 6 +-
>> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 12 +-
>> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 20 +-
>> net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 11 +-
>> net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 26 +-
>> net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 13 +-
>> net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 5 +-
>> net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +-
>> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 97 +++---
>> net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +-
>> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 13 +-
>> net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +-
>> net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +-
>> net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 2 +
>> net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 2 +
>> security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +-
>> security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 +-
>> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 121 ++++---
>> security/commoncap.c | 7 +-
>> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 +-
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 10 +-
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +-
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 36 +-
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 19 +-
>> security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 1 +
>> security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +-
>> security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +-
>> security/security.c | 586 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 109 +++---
>> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +-
>> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 +
>> security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
>> security/selinux/netlabel.c | 25 +-
>> security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +-
>> security/smack/smack.h | 6 +
>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 124 ++++---
>> security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 +-
>> security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 +-
>> security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +-
>> security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 +-
>> 66 files changed, 1376 insertions(+), 580 deletions(-)
>>
>
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