[PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf
Andy Lutomirski
luto at amacapital.net
Wed Aug 7 13:52:36 UTC 2019
> On Aug 7, 2019, at 2:03 AM, Lorenz Bauer <lmb at cloudflare.com> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 7 Aug 2019 at 06:24, Andy Lutomirski <luto at kernel.org> wrote:
>> a) Those that, by design, control privileged operations. This
>> includes most attach calls, but it also includes allow_ptr_leaks,
>> bpf_probe_read(), and quite a few other things. It also includes all
>> of the by_id calls, I think, unless some clever modification to the
>> way they worked would isolate different users' objects. I think that
>> persistent objects can do pretty much everything that by_id users
>> would need, so this isn't a big deal.
>
> Slightly OT, since this is an implementation question: GET_MAP_FD_BY_ID
> is useful to iterate a nested map. This isn't covered by rights to
> persistent objects,
> so it would need some thought.
>
>
A call to get an fd to a map referenced by a map to which you already have an fd seems reasonable to me. The new fd would inherit the old fd’s access mode.
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