[PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf

Lorenz Bauer lmb at cloudflare.com
Wed Aug 7 09:03:57 UTC 2019


On Wed, 7 Aug 2019 at 06:24, Andy Lutomirski <luto at kernel.org> wrote:
> a) Those that, by design, control privileged operations.  This
> includes most attach calls, but it also includes allow_ptr_leaks,
> bpf_probe_read(), and quite a few other things.  It also includes all
> of the by_id calls, I think, unless some clever modification to the
> way they worked would isolate different users' objects.  I think that
> persistent objects can do pretty much everything that by_id users
> would need, so this isn't a big deal.

Slightly OT, since this is an implementation question: GET_MAP_FD_BY_ID
is useful to iterate a nested map. This isn't covered by rights to
persistent objects,
so it would need some thought.

-- 
Lorenz Bauer  |  Systems Engineer
6th Floor, County Hall/The Riverside Building, SE1 7PB, UK

www.cloudflare.com



More information about the Linux-security-module-archive mailing list