[PATCH v3 1/2] keys: Protect key_user lifetime during ownership changes
Chengfeng Ye
nicoyip.dev at gmail.com
Sun Sep 27 16:25:27 UTC 2026
keyctl_chown_key() replaces key->user under key->sem and drops the
reference to the previous owner after releasing the semaphore. Readers
which do not hold that semaphore can still be using the previous owner
when key_user_put() frees it.
For example, namespace filtering in /proc/keys can race with chown:
/proc/keys reader keyctl_chown_key()
user = key->user
key->user = newowner
key_user_put(old)
kfree(old)
read user->uid
An earlier instrumented run reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in proc_keys_start+0x353/0x440
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881128abbc0 by task poc/88
Call Trace:
proc_keys_start+0x353/0x440
seq_read_iter+0x25d/0x1190
proc_reg_read_iter+0x19e/0x260
Allocated by task 86:
key_user_lookup+0x1b4/0x540
keyctl_chown_key+0x3cc/0xbf0
Freed by task 87:
kfree+0x149/0x330
keyctl_chown_key+0x7b0/0xbf0
Serialize pointer replacement and the affected readers with key_user_lock,
which already protects final key_user removal. Take the lock explicitly
while /proc/keys and find_keyring_by_name() copy the owner's UID. Retain
the quota-owner UID rather than substituting key->uid, since they may
differ for thread keyrings.
Also hold the lock across owner accesses in key_payload_reserve() and
across the instantiated-key count increments. Instantiation need not hold
the target key's semaphore, so these paths need the same lifetime
protection. Leave key-state publication and the chown accounting transfer
outside the new critical sections for the separate accounting fix.
Fixes: 5801649d8b83 ("[PATCH] keys: let keyctl_chown() change a key's owner")
Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev at gmail.com>
---
Changes in v3:
- Split from v2 as patch 1/2; see the cover letter for the full split.
- Rebase onto current mainline and retain explicit reader-side locking.
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260904080940.575882-1-nicoyip.dev@gmail.com/
security/keys/key.c | 13 +++++++++++--
security/keys/keyctl.c | 2 ++
security/keys/keyring.c | 7 ++++++-
security/keys/proc.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index b34a64d81d47..d0d583194b05 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct rb_root key_serial_tree; /* tree of keys indexed by serial */
DEFINE_SPINLOCK(key_serial_lock);
struct rb_root key_user_tree; /* tree of quota records indexed by UID */
+/* Protects key_user_tree and key ownership changes. */
DEFINE_SPINLOCK(key_user_lock);
unsigned int key_quota_root_maxkeys = 1000000; /* root's key count quota */
@@ -380,9 +381,12 @@ int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen)
/* contemplate the quota adjustment */
if (delta != 0 && test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
- unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(key->user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
- key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
unsigned long flags;
+ unsigned int maxbytes;
+
+ spin_lock(&key_user_lock);
+ maxbytes = uid_eq(key->user->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
+ key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
spin_lock_irqsave(&key->user->lock, flags);
@@ -396,6 +400,7 @@ int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen)
key->quotalen += delta;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->user->lock, flags);
+ spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
}
/* change the recorded data length if that didn't generate an error */
@@ -447,7 +452,9 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
if (ret == 0) {
/* mark the key as being instantiated */
+ spin_lock(&key_user_lock);
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
+ spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
mark_key_instantiated(key, 0);
notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_INSTANTIATED, 0);
@@ -604,7 +611,9 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
/* can't instantiate twice */
if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) {
/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
+ spin_lock(&key_user_lock);
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
+ spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
mark_key_instantiated(key, -error);
notify_key(key, NOTIFY_KEY_INSTANTIATED, -error);
key_set_expiry(key, ktime_get_real_seconds() + timeout);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index d14ace88e529..c17924609317 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1036,8 +1036,10 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys);
}
+ spin_lock(&key_user_lock);
zapowner = key->user;
key->user = newowner;
+ spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
key->uid = uid;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 15bf4af8f282..5943e8b48c0f 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1148,6 +1148,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
struct key *keyring;
+ kuid_t uid;
if (!name)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
@@ -1158,7 +1159,11 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring)
* grants Search permission and that hasn't been revoked
*/
list_for_each_entry(keyring, &ns->keyring_name_list, name_link) {
- if (!kuid_has_mapping(ns, keyring->user->uid))
+ spin_lock(&key_user_lock);
+ uid = keyring->user->uid;
+ spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
+
+ if (!kuid_has_mapping(ns, uid))
continue;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 4f4e2c1824f1..e507c500c068 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -68,7 +68,13 @@ static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct seq_file *p, struct rb_node *n)
n = rb_next(n);
while (n) {
struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
- if (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, key->user->uid))
+ kuid_t uid;
+
+ spin_lock(&key_user_lock);
+ uid = key->user->uid;
+ spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
+
+ if (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, uid))
break;
n = rb_next(n);
}
@@ -80,6 +86,7 @@ static struct key *find_ge_key(struct seq_file *p, key_serial_t id)
struct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p);
struct rb_node *n = key_serial_tree.rb_node;
struct key *minkey = NULL;
+ kuid_t uid;
while (n) {
struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
@@ -100,7 +107,11 @@ static struct key *find_ge_key(struct seq_file *p, key_serial_t id)
return NULL;
for (;;) {
- if (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, minkey->user->uid))
+ spin_lock(&key_user_lock);
+ uid = minkey->user->uid;
+ spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
+
+ if (kuid_has_mapping(user_ns, uid))
return minkey;
n = rb_next(&minkey->serial_node);
if (!n)
--
2.43.0
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