[PATCH RFC v2 4/8] security: dma-buf: Add dma_buf_charge_cgroup LSM hook
sashiko-bot at kernel.org
sashiko-bot at kernel.org
Thu Oct 22 15:44:17 UTC 2026
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] dma-buf: heaps: build failure in dma_heap_ioctl_allocate() when CONFIG_MEMCG=n
- [Medium] dma-heap: missing __padding zero check in dma_heap_ioctl_allocate()
--
commit c7d9f1c9769a263b2541e4535f61a1da114ca74b
Author: Albert Esteve <aesteve at redhat.com>
security: dma-buf: Add dma_buf_charge_cgroup LSM hook
This patch adds the security_dma_buf_charge_cgroup() LSM hook and calls it
in dma_heap_ioctl_allocate() when charge_fd refers to a cgroupfd. When
CONFIG_SECURITY is disabled, the hook compiles to a no-op inline returning 0.
> diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/dma-heap.c b/drivers/dma-buf/dma-heap.c
> index c315739178867..e06131f4655d8 100644
> --- a/drivers/dma-buf/dma-heap.c
> +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/dma-heap.c
> @@ -115,7 +115,13 @@ static struct dma_buf *dma_heap_ioctl_allocate(struct file *file, void *data)
>
> memcg = mem_cgroup_from_css(css);
> rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> + ret = security_dma_buf_charge_cgroup(current_cred(), cgrp);
> cgroup_put(cgrp);
> + if (ret) {
> + mem_cgroup_put(memcg);
> + return ERR_PTR(ret);
> + }
[Severity: Medium]
Will drivers/dma-buf/dma-heap.c fail to build when CONFIG_DMABUF_HEAPS=y and
CONFIG_MEMCG=n (or CONFIG_CGROUPS=n)?
In drivers/dma-buf/Kconfig, DMABUF_HEAPS only selects DMA_SHARED_BUFFER and
does not depend on CONFIG_MEMCG or CONFIG_CGROUPS:
menuconfig DMABUF_HEAPS
bool "DMA-BUF Userland Memory Heaps"
select DMA_SHARED_BUFFER
In dma_heap_ioctl_allocate(), the cgroupfd path introduced earlier in this
series ("dma-heap: charge dma-buf memory via explicit memcg") and updated
here unconditionally references cgroup_get_from_fd(), cgroup_css(),
memory_cgrp_subsys, css_tryget_online(), and cgroup_put():
cgrp = cgroup_get_from_fd(heap_allocation->charge_fd);
if (!IS_ERR(cgrp)) {
/* charge_fd is a cgroupfd */
rcu_read_lock();
css = cgroup_css(cgrp, &memory_cgrp_subsys);
if (!css || !css_tryget_online(css)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
cgroup_put(cgrp);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
}
In include/linux/cgroup_subsys.h, SUBSYS(memory) (which declares
memory_cgrp_subsys in include/linux/cgroup.h) is only emitted when
CONFIG_MEMCG is enabled:
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MEMCG)
SUBSYS(memory)
#endif
Additionally, in include/linux/cgroup.h, cgroup_get_from_fd(),
css_tryget_online(), cgroup_css(), and cgroup_put() are only declared inside
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS and have no stubs when CONFIG_CGROUPS=n, unlike the
helpers in include/linux/memcontrol.h.
Should the cgroupfd resolution block in dma_heap_ioctl_allocate() be guarded
with #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG?
> } else {
> /* charge_fd is a pidfd */
> task = pidfd_get_task(heap_allocation->charge_fd, &pidfd_flags);
[Severity: Medium]
Also in dma_heap_ioctl_allocate(), should non-zero values in
heap_allocation->__padding be rejected with ERR_PTR(-EINVAL)?
Earlier in this series ("dma-heap: charge dma-buf memory via explicit
memcg"), struct dma_heap_allocation_data in include/uapi/linux/dma-heap.h was
extended with charge_fd and __padding:
* @__padding: reserved, must be zero
*
* Provided by userspace as an argument to the ioctl
*/
struct dma_heap_allocation_data {
__u64 len;
__u32 fd;
__u32 fd_flags;
__u64 heap_flags;
__u32 charge_fd;
__u32 __padding;
};
When a userspace process issues ioctl(heap_fd, DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC, &alloc)
with a 32-byte struct dma_heap_allocation_data where alloc.__padding != 0,
dma_heap_ioctl() copies all 32 bytes into kdata and calls
dma_heap_ioctl_allocate(file, kdata). However, dma_heap_ioctl_allocate() only
checks fd, fd_flags, and heap_flags before processing charge_fd:
if (heap_allocation->fd)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (heap_allocation->fd_flags & ~DMA_HEAP_VALID_FD_FLAGS)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (heap_allocation->heap_flags & ~DMA_HEAP_VALID_HEAP_FLAGS)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
Because dma_heap_ioctl() zeroes trailing bytes when ksize > in_size:
if (ksize > in_size)
memset(kdata + in_size, 0, ksize - in_size);
legacy 24-byte ioctl callers already have __padding zeroed, whereas 32-byte
callers can currently pass arbitrary non-zero values in __padding without
receiving -EINVAL, preventing __padding from being safely repurposed in the
future.
[ ... ]
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261021-v2_20230123_tjmercier_google_com-v2-0-ef6ee2dd8c5c@redhat.com?part=4
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