[PATCH v2] keys/trusted_keys: reuse TPM version in option handling
Srish Srinivasan
ssrish at linux.ibm.com
Mon Oct 5 06:01:46 UTC 2026
Hi Jarkko,
On 10/5/26 8:54 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 02, 2026 at 12:40:50PM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
>> Determine the TPM version once in the seal and unseal paths and reuse it
>> when allocating and parsing trusted key options. This avoids redundant TPM
>> version checks.
> So this is a bit nitpicking perhaps but a patch that would just clean
> the code up a bit would not be be worth of applying. Almost anything
> that "does nothing" goes to that bin.
>
> What I'm saying is that the conclusion in the last sentence goes to
> wrong direction but luckily the change has also feasible effects that
> we care about.
>
> By caching tpm_is_tpm2() there are less fallible sites in the key
> creation process, and reduced number of roundtrips with the TPM chip.
>
> Or from blackbox perspective it reduces I/O traffic between kernel
> and the hardware platform.
Yes, that makes sense. Thank you for pointing this out.
I will revise the commit message to highlight the reduced failure
surface and I/O between the kernel and the TPM, and
send v3.
>
>> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish at linux.ibm.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb at linux.ibm.com>
>> ---
>> Changelog:
>>
>> v2:
>> - Use bool to indicate whether the chip is TPM 2.0 in the option helpers
>>
>> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 35 +++++++++--------------
>> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>> index 3ec078ca3f97..6dbce058368f 100644
>> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>> @@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
>>
>> /* can have zero or more token= options */
>> static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> - struct trusted_key_options *opt)
>> + struct trusted_key_options *opt, bool is_tpm2)
>> {
>> struct trusted_key_tpm *private = opt->private;
>> substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
>> @@ -712,13 +712,8 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> unsigned long token_mask = 0;
>> unsigned int digest_len;
>> int i;
>> - int tpm2;
>> -
>> - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
>> - if (tpm2 < 0)
>> - return tpm2;
>>
>> - private->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
>> + private->hash = is_tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
>>
>> if (!c)
>> return 0;
>> @@ -773,7 +768,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> break;
>> }
>>
>> - if (tpm2 &&
>> + if (is_tpm2 &&
>> private->blobauth_len <=
>> sizeof(private->blobauth)) {
>> memcpy(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
>> @@ -808,14 +803,15 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> }
>> if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> - if (!tpm2 && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1) {
>> + if (!is_tpm2 && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1) {
>> pr_info("TPM 1.x only supports SHA-1.\n");
>> return -EINVAL;
>> }
>> break;
>> case Opt_policydigest:
>> digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash];
>> - if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
>> + if (!is_tpm2 ||
>> + strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
>> return -EINVAL;
>> res = hex2bin(private->policydigest, args[0].from,
>> digest_len);
>> @@ -824,7 +820,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> private->policydigest_len = digest_len;
>> break;
>> case Opt_policyhandle:
>> - if (!tpm2)
>> + if (!is_tpm2)
>> return -EINVAL;
>> res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
>> if (res < 0)
>> @@ -838,15 +834,10 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> -static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
>> +static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(bool is_tpm2)
>> {
>> struct trusted_key_tpm *private;
>> struct trusted_key_options *options;
>> - int tpm2;
>> -
>> - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
>> - if (tpm2 < 0)
>> - return NULL;
>>
>> options = kzalloc_obj(*options);
>> if (options) {
>> @@ -858,7 +849,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
>> kfree_sensitive(options);
>> options = NULL;
>> } else {
>> - if (!tpm2)
>> + if (!is_tpm2)
>> private->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
>> options->private = private;
>> }
>> @@ -877,13 +868,13 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>> if (tpm2 < 0)
>> return tpm2;
>>
>> - options = trusted_options_alloc();
>> + options = trusted_options_alloc(tpm2);
>> if (!options)
>> return -ENOMEM;
>>
>> private = options->private;
>>
>> - ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options);
>> + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options, tpm2);
>> if (ret < 0)
>> return ret;
>> dump_options(options);
>> @@ -922,12 +913,12 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>> if (tpm2 < 0)
>> return tpm2;
>>
>> - options = trusted_options_alloc();
>> + options = trusted_options_alloc(tpm2);
>> if (!options)
>> return -ENOMEM;
>> private = options->private;
>>
>> - ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options);
>> + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options, tpm2);
>> if (ret < 0)
>> return ret;
>> dump_options(options);
>> --
>> 2.53.0
>>
> Br, Jarkko
Thanks,
Srish
More information about the Linux-security-module-archive
mailing list