[PATCH 3/3] mips: sched: Fix CPUMASK_OFFSTACK memory corruption
Aaron Tomlin
atomlin at atomlin.com
Sat May 9 16:48:47 UTC 2026
This patch addresses a critical memory management flaw.
When CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is enabled, cpumask_var_t is a pointer.
Consequently, sizeof(new_mask) evaluates to the pointer size, causing
copy_from_user() to clobber the stack pointer. The subsequent
alloc_cpumask_var() overwrites this with an uninitialised heap address,
discarding the user's mask and risking data leaks. Fix this by
allocating masks first, and using cpumask_size() to copy data directly
into the allocated buffer.
Additionally, reorder the failure goto labels to ensure task locks and
memory allocations are cleanly unwound.
Fixes: 295cbf6d63165 ("[MIPS] Move FPU affinity code into separate file.")
Cc: stable at vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin at atomlin.com>
---
arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c b/arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c
index a6a61393fc1a..4b3424088302 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/mips-mt-fpaff.c
@@ -71,11 +71,23 @@ asmlinkage long mipsmt_sys_sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, unsigned int len,
struct task_struct *p;
int retval;
- if (len < sizeof(new_mask))
+ if (len < cpumask_size())
return -EINVAL;
- if (copy_from_user(&new_mask, user_mask_ptr, sizeof(new_mask)))
- return -EFAULT;
+ if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&cpus_allowed, GFP_KERNEL))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&new_mask, GFP_KERNEL)) {
+ retval = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_cpus_allowed;
+ }
+ if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&effective_mask, GFP_KERNEL)) {
+ retval = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free_new_mask;
+ }
+
+ retval = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(new_mask, user_mask_ptr, cpumask_size()))
+ goto out_free_effective_mask;
cpus_read_lock();
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -84,25 +96,14 @@ asmlinkage long mipsmt_sys_sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, unsigned int len,
if (!p) {
rcu_read_unlock();
cpus_read_unlock();
- return -ESRCH;
+ retval = -ESRCH;
+ goto out_free_effective_mask;
}
/* Prevent p going away */
get_task_struct(p);
rcu_read_unlock();
- if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&cpus_allowed, GFP_KERNEL)) {
- retval = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_put_task;
- }
- if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&new_mask, GFP_KERNEL)) {
- retval = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_free_cpus_allowed;
- }
- if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&effective_mask, GFP_KERNEL)) {
- retval = -ENOMEM;
- goto out_free_new_mask;
- }
if (!check_same_owner(p) && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
retval = -EPERM;
goto out_unlock;
@@ -141,14 +142,14 @@ asmlinkage long mipsmt_sys_sched_setaffinity(pid_t pid, unsigned int len,
}
}
out_unlock:
+ put_task_struct(p);
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+out_free_effective_mask:
free_cpumask_var(effective_mask);
out_free_new_mask:
free_cpumask_var(new_mask);
out_free_cpus_allowed:
free_cpumask_var(cpus_allowed);
-out_put_task:
- put_task_struct(p);
- cpus_read_unlock();
return retval;
}
--
2.51.0
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