[PATCH v5 08/14] module: Move authentication logic into dedicated new file
Thomas Weißschuh
linux at weissschuh.net
Tue May 5 09:05:12 UTC 2026
The module authentication functionality will also be used by the
hash-based module authentication. To make it usable even if
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is disabled, move it to a new file.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux at weissschuh.net>
---
kernel/module/auth.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/module/internal.h | 14 ++++++--
kernel/module/main.c | 6 ++--
kernel/module/signing.c | 90 ++----------------------------------------------
4 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/module/auth.c b/kernel/module/auth.c
index 956ac63d9d33..831a13eb0c9b 100644
--- a/kernel/module/auth.c
+++ b/kernel/module/auth.c
@@ -5,10 +5,16 @@
* Written by David Howells (dhowells at redhat.com)
*/
+#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/module.h>
+#include "internal.h"
#undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
#define MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX "module."
@@ -30,3 +36,82 @@ void set_module_sig_enforced(void)
{
sig_enforce = true;
}
+
+static int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
+{
+ struct module_signature ms;
+ size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
+
+ ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module");
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
+ modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
+ info->len = modlen;
+
+ return module_sig_check(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len);
+}
+
+int module_auth_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
+{
+ int err = -ENODATA;
+ const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIGNATURE_MARKER) - 1;
+ const char *reason;
+ const void *mod = info->hdr;
+ bool mangled_module = flags & (MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_MODVERSIONS |
+ MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC);
+ /*
+ * Do not allow mangled modules as a module with version information
+ * removed is no longer the module that was signed.
+ */
+ if (!mangled_module &&
+ info->len > markerlen &&
+ memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIGNATURE_MARKER, markerlen) == 0) {
+ /* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
+ info->len -= markerlen;
+ err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info);
+ if (!err) {
+ info->auth_ok = true;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We don't permit modules to be loaded into the trusted kernels
+ * without a valid signature on them, but if we're not enforcing,
+ * certain errors are non-fatal.
+ */
+ switch (err) {
+ case -ENODATA:
+ reason = "unsigned module";
+ break;
+ case -ENOPKG:
+ reason = "module with unsupported crypto";
+ break;
+ case -ENOKEY:
+ reason = "module with unavailable key";
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /*
+ * All other errors are fatal, including lack of memory,
+ * unparseable signatures, and signature check failures --
+ * even if signatures aren't required.
+ */
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ if (is_module_sig_enforced()) {
+ pr_notice("Loading of %s is rejected\n", reason);
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+ return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
+}
diff --git a/kernel/module/internal.h b/kernel/module/internal.h
index f8f425b167f1..d923e31a5d8e 100644
--- a/kernel/module/internal.h
+++ b/kernel/module/internal.h
@@ -336,14 +336,24 @@ void module_mark_ro_after_init(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, Elf_Shdr *sechdrs,
const char *secstrings);
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags);
+int module_sig_check(const void *mod, size_t mod_len, const void *sig, size_t sig_len);
#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
-static inline int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
+static inline int module_sig_check(const void *mod, size_t mod_len,
+ const void *sig, size_t sig_len)
{
return 0;
}
#endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_AUTH
+int module_auth_check(struct load_info *info, int flags);
+#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_AUTH */
+static inline int module_auth_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_AUTH */
+
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod, const struct load_info *info);
#else /* !CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK */
diff --git a/kernel/module/main.c b/kernel/module/main.c
index cd8a74df117e..55a010383a8d 100644
--- a/kernel/module/main.c
+++ b/kernel/module/main.c
@@ -3428,8 +3428,8 @@ static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
char *after_dashes;
/*
- * Do the signature check (if any) first. All that
- * the signature check needs is info->len, it does
+ * Do the authentication checks (if any) first. All that
+ * the authentication checks need is info->len, it does
* not need any of the section info. That can be
* set up later. This will minimize the chances
* of a corrupt module causing problems before
@@ -3439,7 +3439,7 @@ static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
* off the sig length at the end of the module, making
* checks against info->len more correct.
*/
- err = module_sig_check(info, flags);
+ err = module_auth_check(info, flags);
if (err)
goto free_copy;
diff --git a/kernel/module/signing.c b/kernel/module/signing.c
index 07a786723221..a49317e3c66f 100644
--- a/kernel/module/signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module/signing.c
@@ -5,98 +5,14 @@
* Written by David Howells (dhowells at redhat.com)
*/
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/errno.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/module_signature.h>
-#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/verification.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <crypto/public_key.h>
-#include <uapi/linux/module.h>
#include "internal.h"
-/*
- * Verify the signature on a module.
- */
-static int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
+int module_sig_check(const void *mod, size_t mod_len, const void *sig, size_t sig_len)
{
- struct module_signature ms;
- size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
- int ret;
-
- if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
-
- ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module");
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
- modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
- info->len = modlen;
-
- return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
+ return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, mod_len, sig, sig_len,
VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
NULL, NULL);
}
-
-int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
-{
- int err = -ENODATA;
- const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIGNATURE_MARKER) - 1;
- const char *reason;
- const void *mod = info->hdr;
- bool mangled_module = flags & (MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_MODVERSIONS |
- MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC);
- /*
- * Do not allow mangled modules as a module with version information
- * removed is no longer the module that was signed.
- */
- if (!mangled_module &&
- info->len > markerlen &&
- memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIGNATURE_MARKER, markerlen) == 0) {
- /* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
- info->len -= markerlen;
- err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info);
- if (!err) {
- info->auth_ok = true;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * We don't permit modules to be loaded into the trusted kernels
- * without a valid signature on them, but if we're not enforcing,
- * certain errors are non-fatal.
- */
- switch (err) {
- case -ENODATA:
- reason = "unsigned module";
- break;
- case -ENOPKG:
- reason = "module with unsupported crypto";
- break;
- case -ENOKEY:
- reason = "module with unavailable key";
- break;
-
- default:
- /*
- * All other errors are fatal, including lack of memory,
- * unparseable signatures, and signature check failures --
- * even if signatures aren't required.
- */
- return err;
- }
-
- if (is_module_sig_enforced()) {
- pr_notice("Loading of %s is rejected\n", reason);
- return -EKEYREJECTED;
- }
-
- return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
-}
--
2.54.0
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