[PATCH 2/3] proc: query LSMs for introspective mem access (if PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS)

[Christian Brauner]

On Tue, Aug 18, 2026 at 09:51:06PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> If the system is running with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, LSMs currently have no
> good opportunity to block a process from overwriting read-only code in its
> own address space through FOLL_FORCE writes via /proc/self/mem.
> The security_ptrace_access_check() LSM hook is bypassed when a process
> opens /proc/self/mem because this is considered "introspection".
> 
> This causes a hole in SELinux EXECMEM enforcement, which tries to ensure
> that a process cannot create executable anonymous pages.
> 
> PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE prevents that and ensures that such FOLL_FORCE
> accesses are only possible when the LSM allows ptrace() attachment; but it
> is unclear how quickly PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE can be deployed in
> environments running lots of third-party code, such as Android.
> 
> So, introduce a new LSM hook that can forbid FOLL_FORCE specifically for
> such "introspective" accesses.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh at google.com>
> ---
>  fs/proc/base.c                |  6 ++++++
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  1 +
>  include/linux/security.h      |  6 ++++++
>  security/security.c           | 15 +++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index bec6197329dc..3dfaef49bb70 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -851,6 +851,8 @@ static int __mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned int mode)
>  /* private_data for proc_mem_operations */
>  struct mem_private {
>  	struct mm_struct *mm;
> +	/* Was the ptrace access check bypassed due to introspection? */
> +	bool introspection;
>  };
>  
>  static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> @@ -864,12 +866,14 @@ static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
>  	priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
>  	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(priv->mm))
>  		return priv->mm ? PTR_ERR(priv->mm) : -ESRCH;
> +	priv->introspection = priv->mm == current->mm;
>  	file->private_data = no_free_ptr(priv);
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
>  static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm)
>  {
> +	struct mem_private *priv = file->private_data;
>  	struct task_struct *task;
>  	bool ptrace_active = false;
>  
> @@ -886,6 +890,8 @@ static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm)
>  		}
>  		return ptrace_active;
>  	default:
> +		if (priv->introspection)
> +			return security_introspect_mem_foll_force(file->f_cred) == 0;

Hm. Why not pass the reason to security_introspect_mem_foll_force() and
call it unconditionally? Similarly it could also be called for the
active ptracer case. Then you'd just need to pass a flag to the security
hook and the LSM can decide based on that.