[PATCH 2/3] proc: query LSMs for introspective mem access (if PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS)

[Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)]

On Mon, Aug 24, 2026 at 07:06:04PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 21, 2026 at 8:52 PM Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs at kernel.org> wrote:
> > OK so the whole thing is:
> >
> > mem_open()
> >   -> __mem_open()
> >     -> proc_mem_open()
> >       -> mm_access()
> >         -> may_access_mm()
> >
> > And:
> >
> > static bool may_access_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
> > {
> >         if (mm == current->mm)
> >                 return true;
> >         ...
> > }
> >
> > And what this flag is carrying is 'hey the reason we allowed the _open_ is
> > because it's looking at its own address space'.
>
> Yes.

OK cool. Obviously do agree with David that calling out the ownership aspect in
the name would be helpful!

>
> > I did wonder if what you're protecting against is even a process updating
> > execmem _it_ owns, no fd shared anywhere, as something LSM might want to
> > prevent even so?
>
> Sorry, can you rephrase that? My goal with this series is to let LSMs
> block a process that tries to modify its own non-writable executable
> memory using /proc/self/mem; I'm not sure if that answers your
> question.

Right, I guess my confusion comes from David's clarification about passing an
fd, perhaps I misunderstood that being somehow the _primary_ thing you were
protecting against.

>
> For context: In this series, I'm using "execmem" to refer to the
> SELinux permission PROCESS__EXECMEM, which essentially controls
> whether a process is allowed to create writable+executable mappings
> that can contain anonymous pages. Additionally, it blocks creating
> executable mappings of S_PRIVATE inodes. There are other SELinux
> permissions for things like making a VMA containing anonymous pages
> executable (FILE__EXECMOD and others) or mapping files as executable
> (FILE__EXECUTE). FILE__EXECUTE is granular, it can be granted based on
> the security labels of the process and the file that is mapped.

Ack thanks for the clarification.

>
> > The sharing a /proc/mem fd seems like that's a pretty dumb thing to do in
> > general :) but I guess you have to protect against that.
>
> Yeah, it's a kinda weird thing to do...

Yup :)) but I guess we have to account for people doing weird stuff...

In this case (I do mention it in a reply elsewhere I think) it does seem
like perhaps you should separately check for current->mm != mm of (what was
originally /proc/self/mm)?

Or at least it seems like a crazy thing to be able to get full access to
another process's memory (that it... gave you though).

Anyway perhaps overthinking it :)

--
Cheers, Lorenzo