[PATCH bpf-next 1/2] lsm: add bpf_security_locked_down() kfunc

[bot+bpf-ci at kernel.org]

> lsm: add bpf_security_locked_down() kfunc
>
> Add a new kfunc bpf_security_locked_down, which calls
> security_locked_down and returns the result.
>
> Create a new file security/lsm_kfuncs.c for LSM framework kfuncs.
>
> Reject reasons outside (LOCKDOWN_NONE, LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX)
> with -EINVAL before dispatching the hook. Limit the kfunc to
> BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL programs, and refuse it
> to programs attached to the locked_down hook itself, which would
> recurse into the dispatch.
>
> Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77 at gmail.com>

This isn't a bug, but could the changelog lead with the use case that
motivates exposing security_locked_down() to BPF programs, instead of
restating what each hunk does?


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