[PATCH] SELinux: Measure state and hash of policy using IMA

Stephen Smalley stephen.smalley.work at gmail.com
Mon Sep 7 22:32:16 UTC 2020


On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 5:39 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
<nramas at linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>
> Critical data structures of security modules are currently not measured.
> Therefore an attestation service, for instance, would not be able to
> attest whether the security modules are always operating with the policies
> and configuration that the system administrator had setup. The policies
> and configuration for the security modules could be tampered with by
> rogue user mode agents or modified through some inadvertent actions on
> the system. Measuring such critical data would enable an attestation
> service to reliably assess the security configuration of the system.
>
> SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this
> security module that needs to be measured. This measurement can be used
> by an attestation service, for instance, to verify if the configuration
> and policies have been setup correctly and that they haven't been tampered
> with at runtime.
>
> Measure SELinux configuration, policy capabilities settings, and the hash
> of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data().
> Since the size of the loaded policy can be quite large, hash of the policy
> is measured instead of the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log.
>
> Enable early boot measurement for SELinux in IMA since SELinux
> initializes its state and policy before custom IMA policy is loaded.
>
> Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy:
>
> 10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state-1595389364:287899386 696e697469616c697a65643d313b656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574776f726b5f706565725f636f6e74726f6c733d313b6f70656e5f7065726d733d313b657874656e6465645f736f636b65745f636c6173733d313b616c776179735f636865636b5f6e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75705f7365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e705f6e6f737569645f7472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66735f7365636c6162656c5f73796d6c696e6b733d303
> 10 9e81...0857 ima-buf sha256:4941...68fc selinux-policy-hash-1597335667:462051628 8d1d...1834
>
> To verify the measurement check the following:
>
> Execute the following command to extract the measured data
> from the IMA log for SELinux configuration (selinux-state).
>
>   grep -m 1 "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p
>
> The output should be the list of key-value pairs. For example,
>  initialized=1;enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;
>
> To verify the measured data with the current SELinux state:
>
>  => enabled should be set to 1 if /sys/fs/selinux folder exists,
>     0 otherwise
>
> For other entries, compare the integer value in the files
>  => /sys/fs/selinux/enforce
>  => /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot
> And, each of the policy capabilities files under
>  => /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities
>
> For selinux-policy-hash, the hash of SELinux policy is included
> in the IMA log entry.
>
> To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run
> the following commands and verify the output hash values match.
>
>   sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1
>
>   grep -m 1 "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | cut -d' ' -f 6
>
> This patch is based on commit 66ccd2560aff ("selinux: simplify away security_policydb_len()")
> in "next" branch in https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git
>
> This patch is dependent on the following patch series and must be
> applied in the given order:
>         https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11709527/
>         https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11730193/
>         https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11730757/
>
> Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas at linux.microsoft.com>
> Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work at gmail.com>
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp at intel.com> # error: implicit declaration of function 'vfree'
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp at intel.com> # error: implicit declaration of function 'crypto_alloc_shash'
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp at intel.com> # sparse: symbol 'security_read_selinux_policy' was not declared. Should it be static?

Not sure these Reported-by lines are useful since they were just on
submitted versions of the patch not on an actual merged commit.

> diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..caf9107937d9
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c
<snip>
> +void selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state, bool policy_mutex_held)
> +{
<snip>
> +
> +       if (!policy_mutex_held)
> +               mutex_lock(&state->policy_mutex);
> +
> +       rc = security_read_policy_kernel(state, &policy, &policy_len);
> +
> +       if (!policy_mutex_held)
> +               mutex_unlock(&state->policy_mutex);

This kind of conditional taking of a mutex is generally frowned upon
in my experience.
You should likely just always take the mutex in the callers of
selinux_measure_state() instead.
In some cases, it may be the caller of the caller.  Arguably selinuxfs
could be taking it around all state modifying operations (e.g.
enforce, checkreqprot) not just policy modifying ones although it
isn't strictly for that purpose.



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