[PATCH v2 1/3] capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE

Andrei Vagin avagin at gmail.com
Tue Jun 9 03:42:21 UTC 2020


On Wed, Jun 03, 2020 at 06:23:26PM +0200, Adrian Reber wrote:
> This patch introduces CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, a new capability facilitating
> checkpoint/restore for non-root users.
> 
> Over the last years, The CRIU (Checkpoint/Restore In Userspace) team has been
> asked numerous times if it is possible to checkpoint/restore a process as
> non-root. The answer usually was: 'almost'.
> 
> The main blocker to restore a process as non-root was to control the PID of the
> restored process. This feature available via the clone3 system call, or via
> /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid is unfortunately guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> 
> In the past two years, requests for non-root checkpoint/restore have increased
> due to the following use cases:
> * Checkpoint/Restore in an HPC environment in combination with a resource
>   manager distributing jobs where users are always running as non-root.
>   There is a desire to provide a way to checkpoint and restore long running
>   jobs.
> * Container migration as non-root
> * We have been in contact with JVM developers who are integrating
>   CRIU into a Java VM to decrease the startup time. These checkpoint/restore
>   applications are not meant to be running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> 
...
> 
> The introduced capability allows to:
> * Control PIDs when the current user is CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable
>   for the corresponding PID namespace via ns_last_pid/clone3.
> * Open files in /proc/pid/map_files when the current user is
>   CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable in the root namespace, useful for recovering
>   files that are unreachable via the file system such as deleted files, or memfd
>   files.

PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP is needed for C/R and it is protected by
CAP_SYS_ADMIN too.

Thanks,
Andrei



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