[RFC PATCH] ima: force the re-evaluation of files on untrusted file systems

Mimi Zohar zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com
Mon Feb 5 13:40:54 UTC 2018


On filesystems, such as fuse or remote filesystems, that we can not
detect or rely on the filesystem to tell us when a file has changed,
always re-measure, re-appraise, and/or re-audit the file.

Signed-of-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar at linux.vnet.ibm.com>

---
Hi Miklos,

Was something like this what you had in mind?

Mimi
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 6d78cb26784d..a428bd75232e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 			       int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int opened)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
@@ -228,9 +229,16 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 				 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
 				 IMA_ACTION_FLAGS);
 
-	if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags))
-		/* reset all flags if ima_inode_setxattr was called */
+	/*
+	 * Re-measure, re-appraise, and/or re-audit a file, if the security
+	 * xattrs changed or if the file is on an untrusted file system
+	 * (eg. FUSE, remote filesystems).
+	 */
+	if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags) ||
+	    (dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_revalidate)) {
 		iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
+		iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+	}
 
 	/* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
 	 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
-- 
2.7.5

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