Difference between revisions of "Exploit Methods/Function pointer overwrite"

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(Created page with "= Details = When an attacker has a write primitive, they can start function pointers to redirect execution. Function pointers exist in a large number of places in the kernel r...")
 
 
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= Details =
= Details =
When an attacker has a write primitive, they can start function pointers to redirect execution. Function pointers exist in a large number of places in the kernel ranging from function pointer tables (e.g. fops), to vector and descriptor tables.
When an attacker has a write primitive, they can overwrite function pointers to redirect execution. Function pointers exist in a large number of places in the kernel ranging from function pointer tables (e.g. fops), to vector and descriptor tables.


= Examples =
= Examples =
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= Mitigations =
= Mitigations =


* make function pointer tables read-only (e.g. PAX_CONSTIFY_PLUGIN)
* mark function pointer tables "const" when they can be statically assigned, making them read-only for the entire kernel runtime.
* make sensitive targets that need only occasional updates only writable during updates (e.g. PAX_KERNEXEC)
* use __ro_after_init on function pointer tables that are only written during __init so they are read-only during the rest of the kernel runtime.
* make all function pointer tables read-only at compile time (e.g. PAX_CONSTIFY_PLUGIN).
* make sensitive targets that need only occasional updates only writable during rare updates (e.g. PAX_KERNEXEC).

Latest revision as of 16:17, 14 September 2016

Details

When an attacker has a write primitive, they can overwrite function pointers to redirect execution. Function pointers exist in a large number of places in the kernel ranging from function pointer tables (e.g. fops), to vector and descriptor tables.

Examples

Mitigations

  • mark function pointer tables "const" when they can be statically assigned, making them read-only for the entire kernel runtime.
  • use __ro_after_init on function pointer tables that are only written during __init so they are read-only during the rest of the kernel runtime.
  • make all function pointer tables read-only at compile time (e.g. PAX_CONSTIFY_PLUGIN).
  • make sensitive targets that need only occasional updates only writable during rare updates (e.g. PAX_KERNEXEC).