Difference between revisions of "Exploit Methods/Userspace execution"
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Once an attacker has gain control over the instruction pointers, it must be aimed somewhere. The place where attackers have the most control over memory layout tends to be in userspace, so it has been natural to place malicious code in userspace and have the kernel redirection execution there. (Frequently known as "ret2usr".) | Once an attacker has gain control over the instruction pointers, it must be aimed somewhere. The place where attackers have the most control over memory layout tends to be in userspace, so it has been natural to place malicious code in userspace and have the kernel redirection execution there. (Frequently known as "ret2usr".) | ||
For more details, see [[Exploit Methods/Userspace data usage|Userspace access]], as that | For more details, see [[Exploit Methods/Userspace data usage|Userspace access]], as that can be superset of userspace execution under some emulation situations. | ||
= Examples = | = Examples = | ||
| Line 8: | Line 8: | ||
= Mitigations = | = Mitigations = | ||
* hardware | * hardware segregation: SMEP (x86), PXN (arm) | ||
* compiler instrumentation to set high bit on function calls | * compiler instrumentation to set high bit on function calls | ||
* emulate memory | * emulate memory segregation via separate page tables (e.g. PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF) | ||
Right now, the upstream options available for Privileged eXecute Never (e.g. PXN, SMEP) are: | Right now, the upstream options available for Privileged eXecute Never (e.g. PXN, SMEP) are: | ||
| Line 19: | Line 19: | ||
|- | |- | ||
|rowspan="3"| ARM | |rowspan="3"| ARM | ||
| | | v7 (32-bit) non-LPAE | ||
| CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN | | CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN (since Linux v4.3) | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | v7 (32-bit) LPAE (e.g. Cortex-A7, A15+) | ||
| hardware PXN | | hardware PXN (since Linux v3.19) | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | | v8.0+ (64-bit) | ||
| hardware PXN | | hardware PXN | ||
|- | |- | ||
|rowspan="2"| x86 | |rowspan="2"| x86 | ||
| pre-Ivy-Bridge | | pre-Ivy-Bridge | ||
|style="color: red;"| nothing | |style="color: red;"| nothing (could use PCID?) | ||
|- | |- | ||
| Ivy-Bridge+ (since May 2012) | | Ivy-Bridge+ (since May 2012) | ||
| Line 38: | Line 38: | ||
| hardware PXN (Address Spaces) | | hardware PXN (Address Spaces) | ||
|- | |- | ||
| | |rowspan="4"| powerpc | ||
|style="color: red;"| nothing | | radix MMU (since POWER9) | ||
| hardware PXN (KUEP, since Linux v4.10) | |||
|- | |||
| PPC64 hash MMU (since POWER7) | |||
|style="color: red;"| nothing yet, but implementation possible | |||
|- | |||
| PPC32 hash MMU (except 601 which doesn't have NX segment) | |||
| hardware PXN (KUEP) | |||
|- | |||
| MPC 8xx | |||
| hardware PXN (KUEP) | |||
|- | |- | ||
|colspan="2"| MIPS | |colspan="2"| MIPS | ||
|style="color: red;"| nothing (could use ASID switching?) | |style="color: red;"| nothing (could use ASID switching?) | ||
|} | |} | ||
Latest revision as of 12:33, 31 July 2019
Details
Once an attacker has gain control over the instruction pointers, it must be aimed somewhere. The place where attackers have the most control over memory layout tends to be in userspace, so it has been natural to place malicious code in userspace and have the kernel redirection execution there. (Frequently known as "ret2usr".)
For more details, see Userspace access, as that can be superset of userspace execution under some emulation situations.
Examples
- See nearly every other exploit example listed under other Exploit Methods and Bug Classes.
Mitigations
- hardware segregation: SMEP (x86), PXN (arm)
- compiler instrumentation to set high bit on function calls
- emulate memory segregation via separate page tables (e.g. PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF)
Right now, the upstream options available for Privileged eXecute Never (e.g. PXN, SMEP) are:
| CPU | Feature Name | |
|---|---|---|
| ARM | v7 (32-bit) non-LPAE | CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN (since Linux v4.3) |
| v7 (32-bit) LPAE (e.g. Cortex-A7, A15+) | hardware PXN (since Linux v3.19) | |
| v8.0+ (64-bit) | hardware PXN | |
| x86 | pre-Ivy-Bridge | nothing (could use PCID?) |
| Ivy-Bridge+ (since May 2012) | hardware PXN (SMEP) | |
| s/390 | hardware PXN (Address Spaces) | |
| powerpc | radix MMU (since POWER9) | hardware PXN (KUEP, since Linux v4.10) |
| PPC64 hash MMU (since POWER7) | nothing yet, but implementation possible | |
| PPC32 hash MMU (except 601 which doesn't have NX segment) | hardware PXN (KUEP) | |
| MPC 8xx | hardware PXN (KUEP) | |
| MIPS | nothing (could use ASID switching?) | |