Difference between revisions of "Exploit Methods/Userspace data usage"
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= Mitigations = | = Mitigations = | ||
* hardware segmentation: SMAP (x86), PAN (arm, arm64), Domains (arm) | * hardware segmentation: SMAP (x86), PAN (arm, arm64), Domains (arm) | ||
* emulate memory segmentation via separate page tables, PCID, etc (e.g. | * emulate memory segmentation via separate page tables, PCID, etc (e.g. PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF) | ||
Right now, the upstream options available for Privileged Access Never (PAN) are: | Right now, the upstream options available for Privileged Access Never (PAN) are: | ||
Revision as of 19:18, 10 December 2015
Details
Sometimes an attacker won't be able to control the instruction pointer directly, but they will be able to redirect the dereference a structure or other pointer. In these cases, it is easiest to aim at malicious structures that have been built in userspace to perform the exploitation.
Examples
Mitigations
- hardware segmentation: SMAP (x86), PAN (arm, arm64), Domains (arm)
- emulate memory segmentation via separate page tables, PCID, etc (e.g. PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF)
Right now, the upstream options available for Privileged Access Never (PAN) are:
| CPU | Feature Name | |
|---|---|---|
| ARM | v7 32-bit non-LPAE | CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN |
| v7 32-bit LPAE | CONFIG_CPU_TTBR0_PAN (Catalin's series) | |
| v8.0 32-bit | CONFIG_CPU_TTBR0_PAN | |
| v8.0 64-bit | nothing | |
| v8.1 | hardware PAN | |
| x86 | pre-late-Broadwell | nothing |
| Broadwell+ | hardware PAN (SMAP) | |
| s/390 | hardware PAN (architectural?) | |
| powerpc | nothing? | |
| MIPS | nothing? | |