[PATCH] landlock: fix LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL bypass via F_SETOWN to invoker's pgid

hexlabsecurity at proton.me hexlabsecurity at proton.me
Thu May 28 21:21:50 UTC 2026


>From 22a0086b44beaaef01883e047dd4a8b8bc3153e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity at proton.me>
Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 01:30:00 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] landlock: fix LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL bypass via F_SETOWN to
 invoker's pgid

A Landlock-restricted process can bypass LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL on the
SIGIO delivery path and deliver arbitrary signals (including SIGKILL via
F_SETSIG) to non-Landlocked targets that share its pgid, by exploiting a
producer-side cache-vs-live evaluation gap.

The SIGIO path in hook_file_send_sigiotask() consults a cached subject
stored in landlock_file(file)->fown_subject at fcntl(F_SETOWN) time
(via hook_file_set_fowner()), instead of evaluating the live Landlock
domain of the invoking task at signal-send time. The capture is gated
by control_current_fowner(), which returns false (skipping capture)
when pid_task(fown->pid, fown->pid_type) is in current's thread group.

This is correct for PIDTYPE_TGID / PIDTYPE_PID, where the target is a
single thread or thread-group leader sharing current's cred. It is
unsafe for PIDTYPE_PGID and PIDTYPE_SID: when current is at the head
of its pgid hlist -- the default placement after fork(),
hlist_add_head_rcu() in kernel/fork.c -- pid_task(pgid, PIDTYPE_PGID)
resolves to current itself, same_thread_group(current, current) is
true, the capture is skipped, and fown_subject.domain stays NULL.

hook_file_send_sigiotask() then short-circuits at
"if (!subject->domain) return 0;", allowing the kernel to fan the
signal out to every member of the group, including tasks outside
current's Landlock domain that the SCOPE_SIGNAL contract is supposed
to protect.

The direct kill() path (hook_task_kill) is unaffected: it evaluates
current's live domain on every call. Only the cached SIGIO path is
broken.

Repro (ordinary unprivileged user; sandbox active in the child):

  int pfd[2]; pipe(pfd);
  landlock_create_ruleset(&{.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL},
                          sizeof(attr), 0);
  prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
  landlock_restrict_self(rfd, 0);
  fcntl(pfd[0], F_SETSIG, SIGKILL);
  fcntl(pfd[0], F_SETOWN, -getpgrp());           /* PIDTYPE_PGID */
  fcntl(pfd[0], F_SETFL, O_ASYNC);
  write(pfd[1], "X", 1);                         /* trigger SIGIO  */
  /* every pgid member receives SIGKILL, including non-sandboxed
   * parent / supervisor / sibling workers */

Tighten control_current_fowner() to apply the thread-group exemption
only when the target identifies a SINGLE task whose Landlock cred is
necessarily shared with current (PIDTYPE_TGID, PIDTYPE_PID). For
PIDTYPE_PGID and PIDTYPE_SID, always capture the current Landlock
subject so the consumer's scope check runs against every member of
the group at delivery time.

Empirically A/B-verified on a 6.12.90 lab kernel (same .config, only
the patch hunk differs): pre-fix build exits with "BUG PRESENT --
SCOPE_SIGNAL BYPASSED", post-fix build exits with "SANDBOX HELD".
hook_task_kill's direct-kill enforcement and the intra-thread-group
F_SETOWN cases continue to work post-patch.

Reported-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity at proton.me>
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity at proton.me>
---
 security/landlock/fs.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index c1ecfe239032..edaa52572cbd 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -1909,6 +1909,18 @@ static bool control_current_fowner(struct fown_struct *const fown)
 	if (!p)
 		return true;

+	/*
+	 * For PIDTYPE_PGID and PIDTYPE_SID, signal delivery fans out to
+	 * every member of the group at SIGIO time. Even when pid_task()
+	 * resolves to current itself (e.g., current is the pgid hlist
+	 * head post-fork), non-current members of the group are still
+	 * valid targets that must be checked by hook_file_send_sigiotask().
+	 * Always capture the current subject for those types so the
+	 * consumer scope check runs against the live fown_subject.
+	 */
+	if (fown->pid_type == PIDTYPE_PGID || fown->pid_type == PIDTYPE_SID)
+		return true;
+
 	return !same_thread_group(p, current);
 }

--
2.43.0



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