[PATCH RFC] security: add LSM blob and hooks for namespaces

[Mickaël Salaün]

On Tue, Feb 17, 2026 at 12:33:28PM +0100, Paul Moore wrote:
> On February 17, 2026 9:54:42 AM Christian Brauner <brauner at kernel.org> wrote:
> > On Mon, Feb 16, 2026 at 07:53:11PM +0100, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > On February 16, 2026 2:52:34 PM Christian Brauner <brauner at kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > All namespace types now share the same ns_common infrastructure. Extend
> > > > this to include a security blob so LSMs can start managing namespaces
> > > > uniformly without having to add one-off hooks or security fields to
> > > > every individual namespace type.
> > > > 
> > > > Add a ns_security pointer to ns_common and the corresponding lbs_ns
> > > > blob size to lsm_blob_sizes. Allocation and freeing hooks are called
> > > > from the common __ns_common_init() and __ns_common_free() paths so
> > > > every namespace type gets covered in one go. All information about the
> > > > namespace type and the appropriate casting helpers to get at the
> > > > containing namespace are available via ns_common making it
> > > > straightforward for LSMs to differentiate when they need to.
> > > > 
> > > > A namespace_install hook is called from validate_ns() during setns(2)
> > > > giving LSMs a chance to enforce policy on namespace transitions.
> > > > 
> > > > Individual namespace types can still have their own specialized security
> > > > hooks when needed. This is just the common baseline that makes it easy
> > > > to track and manage namespaces from the security side without requiring
> > > > every namespace type to reinvent the wheel.
> > > > 
> > > > Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner at kernel.org>
> > > > ---
> > > > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h      |  3 ++
> > > > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h          |  1 +
> > > > include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h |  3 ++
> > > > include/linux/security.h           | 20 ++++++++++
> > > > kernel/nscommon.c                  | 12 ++++++
> > > > kernel/nsproxy.c                   |  8 +++-
> > > > security/lsm_init.c                |  2 +
> > > > security/security.c                | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > > 8 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > 
> > > I still have limited network access for a few more days, but a couple of
> > > quick comments in no particular order ...
> > > 
> > > Generally speaking we don't add things to the LSM interface without a user,
> > > and I can't think of a good reason why we would want to do things
> > > differently here.  This means that when you propose something like this you
> > > should also propose an addition to one of the in-tree LSMs to make use of
> > > it. While the guidance doc linked below (also linked in the LSM MAINTAINERS
> > > entry) doesn't have any guidance for the LSM blobs as they are generally a
> > > byproduct of the hooks, if you are looking for some general info I think the
> > > bits on adding a new LSM hook would be very close to what we would expect
> > > for blob additions.
> > > 
> > > https://github.com/LinuxSecurityModule/kernel/blob/main/README.md
> > > 
> > > Getting to the specifics of namespace related APIs, we've had a lot of
> > > discussions about namespacing and my current opinion is that we need to sort
> > > out if we want a userspace API at the LSM framework layer, or if we want to
> > > do that at the individual LSM layer; there is a lot of nuance there and
> > > while one option may seem like an obvious choice, we need some more
> > > discussion and I need a chance to get caught up on the threads. Once we have
> > > an API decision then we can start sorting out the implementation details
> > > like the LSM blobs.
> > 
> > I might be misunderstanding you but what you are talking about seems
> > namespacing the LSM layer itself.
> > 
> > But I cannot stress enough this is not at all what this patchset is
> > doing. :)
> 
> Likely also a misunderstanding on my end as I triage email/patches via phone.
> 
> Regardless, the guidance in the doc I linked regarding the addition of new
> LSM hooks would appear to apply here.

FYI, I just sent an RFC to leverage this patch with Landlock:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260312100444.2609563-1-mic@digikod.net/