[PATCH RFC bpf-next 1/4] audit: Implement bpf_audit_log_*() wrappers

Frederick Lawler fred at cloudflare.com
Wed Mar 11 21:31:17 UTC 2026


The primary use case is to provide LSM designers a direct API to report
access allow/denies through the audit subsystem similar to how LSM's
traditionally log their accesses.

Left out from this API are functions that are potentially abuseable such as
audit_log_format() where users may fill any field=value pair. Instead, the
API mostly follows what is exposed through security/lsm_audit.c for
consistency with user space audit expectations. Further calls to functions
report once to avoid repeated-call abuse.

Lastly, each audit record corresponds to the loaded BPF program's ID to
track which program reported the log entry. This helps remove
ambiguity in the event multiple programs are registered to the same
security hook.

Exposed functions:

	bpf_audit_log_start()
	bpf_audit_log_end()
	bpf_audit_log_cause()
	bpf_audit_log_cap()
	bpf_audit_log_path()
	bpf_audit_log_file()
	bpf_audit_log_ioctl_op()
	bpf_audit_log_dentry()
	bpf_audit_log_inode()
	bpf_audit_log_task()
	bpf_audit_log_net_sock()
	bpf_audit_log_net_sockaddr()

Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred at cloudflare.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_audit.h   |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/audit.h  |   1 +
 security/lsm_audit_kfuncs.c | 306 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 308 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
index 382c56a97bba1d0e5efe082553338229d541e267..859f51590de417ac246309eb75a760b8632224be 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ struct common_audit_data {
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NOTIFICATION 16
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_ANONINODE	17
 #define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NLMSGTYPE	18
+#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAUSE 19 /* unused */
 	union 	{
 		struct path path;
 		struct dentry *dentry;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 14a1c1fe013acecb12ea6bf81690965421baa7ff..7a22e214fe3e421decfc4109d2e6a3cee996fe51 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@
 #define AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN	1424	/* Landlock domain status */
 #define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS	1425	/* Multiple LSM task contexts */
 #define AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS	1426	/* Multiple LSM objext contexts */
+#define AUDIT_BPF_LSM_ACCESS		1427	/* LSM BPF MAC events */
 
 #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG   1700
 #define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG    1799
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit_kfuncs.c b/security/lsm_audit_kfuncs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0d4fb20be34a61db29aa2c48d2aefc39131e73bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lsm_audit_kfuncs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/* Copyright (c) 2026 Cloudflare */
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/bpf_mem_alloc.h>
+#include <linux/gfp_types.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct bpf_audit_context {
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+	u64 log_once_mask;
+};
+
+static struct bpf_mem_alloc bpf_audit_context_ma;
+
+static inline u64 log_once(struct bpf_audit_context *ac, u64 mask)
+{
+	u64 set = (ac->log_once_mask & mask);
+
+	ac->log_once_mask |= mask;
+	return set;
+}
+
+static inline int __audit_log_lsm_data(struct bpf_audit_context *ac,
+				       struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	if (log_once(ac, BIT_ULL(ad->type)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	audit_log_lsm_data(ac->ab, ad);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();
+
+__bpf_kfunc
+struct bpf_audit_context *bpf_audit_log_start(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
+{
+	char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
+	struct bpf_audit_context *ac;
+
+	ac = bpf_mem_cache_alloc(&bpf_audit_context_ma);
+	if (!ac)
+		return NULL;
+
+	memset(ac, 0, sizeof(*ac));
+	ac->ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
+				 (aux->might_sleep) ? GFP_KERNEL : GFP_ATOMIC,
+				 AUDIT_BPF_LSM_ACCESS);
+	if (!ac->ab) {
+		bpf_mem_cache_free(&bpf_audit_context_ma, ac);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	audit_log_format(ac->ab, "prog-id=%d", aux->id);
+
+	/* Audit may not have a filter configured for syscalls. Include
+	 * potentionally redundant pid & comm information
+	 */
+	audit_log_format(ac->ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current));
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ac->ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
+
+	return ac;
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc void bpf_audit_log_end(struct bpf_audit_context *ac)
+{
+	audit_log_end(ac->ab);
+	bpf_mem_cache_free(&bpf_audit_context_ma, ac);
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_audit_log_cause(struct bpf_audit_context *ac,
+				    const char *cause__str)
+{
+	if (log_once(ac, BIT_ULL(LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAUSE)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	audit_log_format(ac->ab, " cause=");
+	audit_log_untrustedstring(ac->ab, cause__str);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_audit_log_cap(struct bpf_audit_context *ac, int cap)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
+	ad.u.cap = cap;
+	return __audit_log_lsm_data(ac, &ad);
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_audit_log_path(struct bpf_audit_context *ac,
+				   const struct path *path)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	/* DATA_PATH prints similar to DATA_FILE */
+	if (log_once(ac, BIT_ULL(LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
+	ad.u.path = *path;
+	return __audit_log_lsm_data(ac, &ad);
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_audit_log_file(struct bpf_audit_context *ac,
+				   struct file *file)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	/* DATA_PATH prints similar to DATA_FILE */
+	if (log_once(ac, BIT_ULL(LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+	ad.u.file = file;
+	return __audit_log_lsm_data(ac, &ad);
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_audit_log_ioctl_op(struct bpf_audit_context *ac,
+				       struct file *file, u16 cmd)
+{
+	struct lsm_ioctlop_audit op = { .path = file->f_path, .cmd = cmd };
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
+	ad.u.op = &op;
+	return __audit_log_lsm_data(ac, &ad);
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_audit_log_dentry(struct bpf_audit_context *ac,
+				     struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	/* DATA_DENTRY prints similar to DATA_INODE */
+	if (log_once(ac, BIT_ULL(LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
+	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
+	return __audit_log_lsm_data(ac, &ad);
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_audit_log_inode(struct bpf_audit_context *ac,
+				    struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	/* DATA_DENTRY prints similar to DATA_INODE */
+	if (log_once(ac, BIT_ULL(LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
+	ad.u.inode = inode;
+	return __audit_log_lsm_data(ac, &ad);
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_audit_log_task(struct bpf_audit_context *ac,
+				   struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK;
+	ad.u.tsk = tsk;
+	return __audit_log_lsm_data(ac, &ad);
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_audit_log_net_sock(struct bpf_audit_context *ac, int netif,
+				       const struct socket *sock)
+{
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = { .sk = sock->sk, .netif = netif };
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	return __audit_log_lsm_data(ac, &ad);
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc int
+bpf_audit_log_net_sockaddr(struct bpf_audit_context *ac, int netif,
+			   const struct sockaddr *saddr__nullable,
+			   const struct sockaddr *daddr__nullable, int addrlen)
+{
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+
+	net.netif = netif;
+
+	if (!saddr__nullable && !daddr__nullable)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (saddr__nullable && daddr__nullable &&
+	    saddr__nullable->sa_family != daddr__nullable->sa_family)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (saddr__nullable)
+		net.family = saddr__nullable->sa_family;
+	else
+		net.family = daddr__nullable->sa_family;
+
+	switch (net.family) {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	case AF_INET6:
+		if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (saddr__nullable) {
+			struct sockaddr_in6 *saddr =
+				(struct sockaddr_in6 *)saddr__nullable;
+			net.fam.v6.saddr = saddr->sin6_addr;
+			net.sport = saddr->sin6_port;
+		}
+
+		if (daddr__nullable) {
+			struct sockaddr_in6 *daddr =
+				(struct sockaddr_in6 *)daddr__nullable;
+			net.fam.v6.daddr = daddr->sin6_addr;
+			net.dport = daddr->sin6_port;
+		}
+		break;
+#endif
+	case AF_INET:
+		if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (saddr__nullable) {
+			struct sockaddr_in *saddr =
+				(struct sockaddr_in *)saddr__nullable;
+			net.fam.v4.saddr = saddr->sin_addr.s_addr;
+			net.sport = saddr->sin_port;
+		}
+
+		if (daddr__nullable) {
+			struct sockaddr_in *daddr =
+				(struct sockaddr_in *)daddr__nullable;
+			net.fam.v4.daddr = daddr->sin_addr.s_addr;
+			net.dport = daddr->sin_port;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+	}
+
+	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad.u.net = &net;
+	return __audit_log_lsm_data(ac, &ad);
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc_end_defs();
+
+BTF_KFUNCS_START(lsm_audit_set_ids)
+
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_audit_log_start,
+	     KF_ACQUIRE | KF_DESTRUCTIVE | KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS | KF_RET_NULL);
+
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_audit_log_end, KF_DESTRUCTIVE | KF_RELEASE);
+
+/* The following have a recursion opportunity if a LSM is attached to any of
+ * the following functions, and a bpf_audit_log_*() is called.
+ *  security_current_getlsmprop_subj,
+ *  security_lsmprop_to_secctx, or
+ *  security_release_secctx
+ */
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_audit_log_cause, KF_DESTRUCTIVE);
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_audit_log_cap, KF_DESTRUCTIVE);
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_audit_log_path, KF_DESTRUCTIVE);
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_audit_log_file, KF_DESTRUCTIVE);
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_audit_log_ioctl_op, KF_DESTRUCTIVE);
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_audit_log_dentry, KF_DESTRUCTIVE);
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_audit_log_inode, KF_DESTRUCTIVE);
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_audit_log_task, KF_DESTRUCTIVE);
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_audit_log_net_sock, KF_DESTRUCTIVE);
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_audit_log_net_sockaddr, KF_DESTRUCTIVE);
+
+BTF_KFUNCS_END(lsm_audit_set_ids)
+
+static int bpf_lsm_audit_kfuncs_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
+				       u32 kfunc_id)
+{
+	if (!btf_id_set8_contains(&lsm_audit_set_ids, kfunc_id))
+		return 0;
+
+	return prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM ? -EACCES : 0;
+}
+
+static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_lsm_audit_set = {
+	.owner = THIS_MODULE,
+	.set = &lsm_audit_set_ids,
+	.filter = bpf_lsm_audit_kfuncs_filter,
+};
+
+static int lsm_audit_init_bpf(void)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = bpf_mem_alloc_init(&bpf_audit_context_ma,
+				 sizeof(struct bpf_audit_context), false);
+	return ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM,
+						 &bpf_lsm_audit_set);
+}
+
+late_initcall(lsm_audit_init_bpf)

-- 
2.43.0




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