[PATCH v4 09/17] module: Make module loading policy usable without MODULE_SIG

[Eric Biggers]

On Tue, Jan 13, 2026 at 01:28:53PM +0100, Thomas Weißschuh wrote:
> The loading policy functionality will also be used by the hash-based
> module validation. Split it out from CONFIG_MODULE_SIG so it is usable
> by both.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux at weissschuh.net>
> ---
>  include/linux/module.h  |  8 ++++----
>  kernel/module/Kconfig   |  5 ++++-
>  kernel/module/main.c    | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  kernel/module/signing.c | 21 ---------------------
>  4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
> index f288ca5cd95b..f9601cba47cd 100644
> --- a/include/linux/module.h
> +++ b/include/linux/module.h
> @@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ struct module {
>  	const u32 *gpl_crcs;
>  	bool using_gplonly_symbols;
>  
> -#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
> +#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_POLICY
>  	/* Signature was verified. */
>  	bool sig_ok;
>  #endif
[...]
> +config MODULE_SIG_POLICY
> +	def_bool MODULE_SIG

Maybe MODULE_AUTH_POLICY?  Hash-based module authentication does not use
signatures.

This issue appears elsewhere in the code too.  There are lots of places
that still refer to module signatures or "sigs", when really module
authentication is meant.

I'm not sure how far you want to go with the renaming, but it's
something to think about.  It's confusing to use the term "signature" to
mean something that is not a signature.

- Eric