[PATCH bpf-next v2 1/5] bpf: Verify signed loader metadata at load time
Alexei Starovoitov
alexei.starovoitov at gmail.com
Fri Jun 26 01:16:19 UTC 2026
On Thu Jun 25, 2026 at 5:59 PM PDT, Paul Moore wrote:
>
> For all the reasons I gave previously, I can't support moving the
> existing security_bpf_prog_load() hook at this point in time.
Paul,
it's not up to you to approve or deny where security_bpf_prog_load()
is called within bpf subsystem as long as it doesn't affect behavior.
Daniel's patch doesn't change observable state from LSMs pov.
It merely moves the call from syscall.c to verifier.c.
So we're going to proceed.
> I'm guessing you still haven't looked at Blaise's patchset from last
> September.
Blaise approach was Nacked because you guys ignored TOCTOU issue.
I pointed it a year ago before AI was a thing. Then sashiko
pointed it again and the bot explained it in detail. It was again
ignored.
Daniel's v1 sadly had the same issue and sashiko spotted it too.
Hence v2 is moving the location of security_bpf_prog_load().
> on-list. As you can see from the lore archives, he has vehemently
> opposed the approach you are proposing for quite a while.
Exactly, because you kept ignoring TOCTOU issue.
Claiming support for signed bpf that can be easily defeated
is a shameless security scam.
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