[PATCH v2 2/2] selftests/landlock: Add test for TCP fast open
Matthieu Buffet
matthieu at buffet.re
Wed Jul 1 21:46:28 UTC 2026
Enforce that TCP Fast Open is controlled by
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP. Semantics of connect() and
sendmsg(MSG_FASTOPEN) should be identical from Landlock's perspective.
Also enforce error code consistency, since UDP sockets ignore
the MSG_FASTOPEN flag while Unix sockets reject it.
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Buffet <matthieu at buffet.re>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 94 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
index 2ed1f76b7a8b..2e4dc5025b04 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
@@ -1281,6 +1281,100 @@ TEST_F(protocol, connect_unspec)
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(bind_fd));
}
+TEST_F(protocol, tcp_fastopen)
+{
+ const bool restricted = variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX &&
+ variant->prot.type == SOCK_STREAM &&
+ (variant->prot.protocol == IPPROTO_TCP || variant->prot.protocol == IPPROTO_IP) &&
+ (variant->prot.domain == AF_INET || variant->prot.domain == AF_INET6);
+ const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ int bind_fd, client_fd, status;
+ char buf;
+ pid_t child;
+
+ bind_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, bind_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, bind_variant(bind_fd, &self->srv0));
+ if (self->srv0.protocol.type == SOCK_STREAM)
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, listen(bind_fd, backlog));
+
+ child = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+ if (child == 0) {
+ int connect_fd, ret;
+
+ /* Closes listening socket for the child. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(bind_fd));
+
+ connect_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, connect_fd);
+
+ if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
+ const int ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ }
+
+ /* Fast Open with no address. */
+ ret = sendto_variant(connect_fd, NULL, NULL, 0, MSG_FASTOPEN);
+ if (self->srv0.protocol.domain == AF_UNIX) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(-ENOTCONN, ret);
+ } else if (self->srv0.protocol.type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(-EDESTADDRREQ, ret);
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(-EINVAL, ret);
+ }
+
+ /* Fast Open to a denied address. */
+ ret = sendto_variant(connect_fd, &self->srv0, "A", 1, MSG_FASTOPEN);
+ if (restricted) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(-EACCES, ret);
+ } else if (self->srv0.protocol.domain == AF_UNIX &&
+ self->srv0.protocol.type == SOCK_STREAM) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(-EOPNOTSUPP, ret);
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(connect_fd));
+ _exit(_metadata->exit_code);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ client_fd = bind_fd;
+ if (!restricted && self->srv0.protocol.type == SOCK_STREAM &&
+ self->srv0.protocol.domain != AF_UNIX) {
+ client_fd = accept(bind_fd, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, client_fd);
+ }
+
+ if (restricted) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, read(client_fd, &buf, 1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENOTCONN, errno);
+ } else if (self->srv0.protocol.domain == AF_UNIX &&
+ self->srv0.protocol.type == SOCK_STREAM) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(-1, read(client_fd, &buf, 1));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, read(client_fd, &buf, 1));
+ EXPECT_EQ('A', buf);
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+ EXPECT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+ EXPECT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ if (client_fd != bind_fd)
+ EXPECT_LE(0, close(client_fd));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(bind_fd));
+}
+
TEST_F(protocol, sendmsg_stream)
{
int srv0_fd, tmp_fd, client_fd, res;
--
2.47.3
More information about the Linux-security-module-archive
mailing list