[RFC PATCH 06/20] bpf: lsm: Add Landlock kfuncs
Paul Moore
paul at paul-moore.com
Wed Jul 1 18:38:08 UTC 2026
On Wed, Jul 1, 2026 at 2:34 PM Mickaël Salaün <mic at digikod.net> wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 01, 2026 at 09:28:22AM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 1, 2026 at 8:52 AM Justin Suess <utilityemal77 at gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Wed, Jul 01, 2026 at 08:12:34AM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Jul 1, 2026 at 6:59 AM Mickaël Salaün <mic at digikod.net> wrote:
> > > > > On Tue, Apr 07, 2026 at 04:01:28PM -0400, Justin Suess wrote:
> > > > > > Create 2 kfuncs exposing control over Landlock functionality to BPF
> > > > > > callers. Export an opaque struct bpf_landlock_ruleset preventing callers
> > > > > > from accessing unstable internal Landlock fields.
> > > >
> > > > Generally speaking we don't want to provide APIs, either in-kernel or
> > > > at the userspace/kernel boundary, that are specific to a single LSM,
> > > > see the LSM syscalls or the security_current_getlsmprop_subj()
> > > > function as examples.
>
> This patch series is not about the LSM framework, only about Landlock
> and its specific model and use case. Landlock using some of the LSM API
> is not relevant here.
Based on a quick look the patchset enables BPF programs to call
directly into Landlock. For the same reason we discourage other parts
of the kernel to call directly into individual LSMs, we want to
discourage BPF programs from calling directly into individual LSMs.
--
paul-moore.com
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