[PATCH v4 10/17] module: Move integrity checks into dedicated function
Thomas Weißschuh
linux at weissschuh.net
Tue Jan 13 12:28:54 UTC 2026
With the addition of hash-based integrity checking, the configuration
matrix is easier to represent in a dedicated function and with explicit
usage of IS_ENABLED().
Drop the now unnecessary stub for module_sig_check().
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux at weissschuh.net>
---
kernel/module/internal.h | 7 -------
kernel/module/main.c | 18 ++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/module/internal.h b/kernel/module/internal.h
index 037fbb3b7168..e053c29a5d08 100644
--- a/kernel/module/internal.h
+++ b/kernel/module/internal.h
@@ -337,14 +337,7 @@ int module_enforce_rwx_sections(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, const Elf_Shdr *sechdrs,
void module_mark_ro_after_init(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr, Elf_Shdr *sechdrs,
const char *secstrings);
-#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags);
-#else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
-static inline int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-#endif /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod, const struct load_info *info);
diff --git a/kernel/module/main.c b/kernel/module/main.c
index 4442397a9f92..9c570078aa9c 100644
--- a/kernel/module/main.c
+++ b/kernel/module/main.c
@@ -3344,6 +3344,16 @@ static int early_mod_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
return err;
}
+static int module_integrity_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG))
+ err = module_sig_check(info, flags);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
/*
* Allocate and load the module: note that size of section 0 is always
* zero, and we rely on this for optional sections.
@@ -3357,18 +3367,18 @@ static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
char *after_dashes;
/*
- * Do the signature check (if any) first. All that
- * the signature check needs is info->len, it does
+ * Do the integrity checks (if any) first. All that
+ * they need is info->len, it does
* not need any of the section info. That can be
* set up later. This will minimize the chances
* of a corrupt module causing problems before
- * we even get to the signature check.
+ * we even get to the integrity check.
*
* The check will also adjust info->len by stripping
* off the sig length at the end of the module, making
* checks against info->len more correct.
*/
- err = module_sig_check(info, flags);
+ err = module_integrity_check(info, flags);
if (err)
goto free_copy;
--
2.52.0
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