[PATCH v6 05/11] tpm2-sessions: Remove AUTH_MAX_NAMES
ross.philipson at oracle.com
ross.philipson at oracle.com
Tue Jan 13 00:22:24 UTC 2026
On 12/14/25 7:38 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> In all of the call sites only one session is ever append. Thus, reduce
> AUTH_MAX_NAMES, which leads into removing constant completely.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko at kernel.org>
> ---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 31 +++++++++++--------------------
> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> index 3bc3c31cf512..37570dc088cf 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> @@ -72,9 +72,6 @@
> #include <crypto/sha2.h>
> #include <crypto/utils.h>
>
> -/* maximum number of names the TPM must remember for authorization */
> -#define AUTH_MAX_NAMES 3
> -
> #define AES_KEY_BYTES AES_KEYSIZE_128
> #define AES_KEY_BITS (AES_KEY_BYTES*8)
>
> @@ -136,8 +133,8 @@ struct tpm2_auth {
> * handle, but they are part of the session by name, which
> * we must compute and remember
> */
> - u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
> - u16 name_size_tbl[AUTH_MAX_NAMES];
> + u8 name[TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
> + u16 name_size;
> };
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
> @@ -261,11 +258,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_read_public);
> int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> u32 handle, u8 *name, u16 name_size)
> {
> -#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
Removing CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC here causes a warning during compile since
the auth variable is only used in the CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC block below.
Ross
> struct tpm2_auth *auth;
> - int slot;
> int ret;
> -#endif
> +
> + if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
> + dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n");
> + ret = -EIO;
> + goto err;
> + }
>
> if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
> tpm_buf_append_handle(chip, buf, handle);
> @@ -273,12 +273,6 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> }
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
> - slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4;
> - if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) {
> - dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n");
> - ret = -EIO;
> - goto err;
> - }
> auth = chip->auth;
> if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
> dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed");
> @@ -287,16 +281,14 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> }
> tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle);
> auth->session += 4;
> - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size);
> - auth->name_size_tbl[slot] = name_size;
> + memcpy(auth->name, name, name_size);
> + auth->name_size = name_size;
> #endif
> return 0;
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
> err:
> tpm2_end_auth_session(chip);
> return ret;
> -#endif
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name);
>
> @@ -665,8 +657,7 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
> /* ordinal is already BE */
> sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&head->ordinal, sizeof(head->ordinal));
> /* add the handle names */
> - for (i = 0; i < handles; i++)
> - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], auth->name_size_tbl[i]);
> + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name, auth->name_size);
> if (offset_s != tpm_buf_length(buf))
> sha256_update(&sctx, &buf->data[offset_s],
> tpm_buf_length(buf) - offset_s);
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