[RFC PATCH 1/1] lsm: Add hook unix_path_connect

[Günther Noack]

On Wed, Dec 31, 2025 at 04:33:14PM -0500, Justin Suess wrote:
> Adds an LSM hook unix_path_connect.
> 
> This hook is called to check the path of a named unix socket before a
> connection is initiated.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77 at gmail.com>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack3000 at gmail.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  1 +
>  include/linux/security.h      |  6 ++++++
>  net/unix/af_unix.c            |  8 ++++++++
>  security/security.c           | 16 ++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 8c42b4bde09c..a42d1aaf3b8a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, watch_key, struct key *key)
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY && CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_path_connect, const struct path *path)

You are placing this guarded by CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK, but there is
also CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH.  Should it be guarded by both?


>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_stream_connect, struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
>  	 struct sock *newsk)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_may_send, struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 83a646d72f6f..ab66f22f7e5a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1638,6 +1638,7 @@ static inline int security_watch_key(struct key *key)
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
>  
> +int security_unix_path_connect(const struct path *path);
>  int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
>  int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk);
>  int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,  struct socket *other);
> @@ -1699,6 +1700,11 @@ static inline int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static inline int security_unix_path_connect(const struct path *path)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  static inline int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
>  					       struct sock *other,
>  					       struct sock *newsk)
> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> index 55cdebfa0da0..af1a6083a69b 100644
> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> @@ -1226,6 +1226,14 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len,
>  	if (!S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode))
>  		goto path_put;
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * We call the hook because we know that the inode is a socket
> +	 * and we hold a valid reference to it via the path.
> +	 */
> +	err = security_unix_path_connect(&path);
> +	if (err)
> +		goto path_put;

In this place, the hook call is done also for the coredump socket.

The coredump socket is a system-wide setting, and it feels weird to me
that unprivileged processes should be able to inhibit that connection?


> +
>  	sk = unix_find_socket_byinode(inode);
>  	if (!sk)
>  		goto path_put;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 31a688650601..17af5d0ddf28 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -4047,6 +4047,22 @@ int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
>  
> +/*
> + * security_unix_path_connect() - Check if a named AF_UNIX socket can connect
> + * @path: Path of the socket being connected to
             ^
mega-nit: lowercase for consistency

> + *
> + * This hook is called to check permissions before connecting to a named
> + * AF_UNIX socket. This is necessary because it was not possible to check the
> + * VFS inode of the target socket before the connection is made.

I'd drop the last sentence; the defense why this is necessary can go
in the commit message, and once we have a call-site for the hook,
someone browsing the kernel code can look up what it is used for.

> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
> + */
> +int security_unix_path_connect(const struct path *path)
> +{
> +	return call_int_hook(unix_path_connect, path);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_path_connect);
> +
>  /**
>   * security_unix_may_send() - Check if AF_UNIX socket can send datagrams
>   * @sock: originating sock
> -- 
> 2.51.0
>