[PATCH v2 2/2] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options
Srish Srinivasan
ssrish at linux.ibm.com
Fri Feb 20 18:34:26 UTC 2026
The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle,
keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash,
policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the
accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure.
Define trusted_tpm_options structure and move the TPM-specific fields
there. Store a pointer to trusted_tpm_options in trusted_key_options's
private.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish at linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb at linux.ibm.com>
---
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 ---
include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 ++++
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 95 ++++++++++++++---------
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 51 ++++++------
4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
index 03527162613f..b80f250305b8 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
@@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {
struct trusted_key_options {
uint16_t keytype;
- uint32_t keyhandle;
- unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
- uint32_t blobauth_len;
- unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
- uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
- unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
- int pcrlock;
- uint32_t hash;
- uint32_t policydigest_len;
- unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
- uint32_t policyhandle;
void *private;
};
diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
index 0fadc6a4f166..355ebd36cbfd 100644
--- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
+++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
@@ -7,6 +7,20 @@
extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops;
+struct trusted_tpm_options {
+ uint32_t keyhandle;
+ unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ uint32_t blobauth_len;
+ unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
+ unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
+ int pcrlock;
+ uint32_t hash;
+ uint32_t policydigest_len;
+ unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ uint32_t policyhandle;
+};
+
int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options);
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 216caef97ffc..741b1d47d9f8 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -48,12 +48,14 @@ enum {
static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private;
+
pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
- pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
- pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
- pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
+ pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", private->keyhandle);
+ pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", private->pcrlock);
+ pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", private->pcrinfo_len);
print_hex_dump(KERN_DEBUG, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
+ 16, 1, private->pcrinfo, private->pcrinfo_len, 0);
}
static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
@@ -609,6 +611,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private;
struct tpm_buf tb;
int ret;
@@ -619,9 +622,10 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
/* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
- ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
+ ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth,
p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
- o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
+ private->blobauth, private->pcrinfo,
+ private->pcrinfo_len);
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
@@ -635,6 +639,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
struct trusted_key_options *o)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private;
struct tpm_buf tb;
int ret;
@@ -642,8 +647,8 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
if (ret)
return ret;
- ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
- o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
+ ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->blob,
+ p->blob_len, private->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
else
@@ -680,6 +685,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
struct trusted_key_options *opt)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = opt->private;
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
char *p = c;
int token;
@@ -695,7 +701,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
if (tpm2 < 0)
return tpm2;
- opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
+ private->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
if (!c)
return 0;
@@ -709,11 +715,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
switch (token) {
case Opt_pcrinfo:
- opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
- if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
+ private->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
+ if (private->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
- res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
- opt->pcrinfo_len);
+ res = hex2bin(private->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
+ private->pcrinfo_len);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
break;
@@ -722,12 +728,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
- opt->keyhandle = handle;
+ private->keyhandle = handle;
break;
case Opt_keyauth:
if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
- res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from,
+ res = hex2bin(private->keyauth, args[0].from,
SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -738,21 +744,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
* hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple
* passwords (although it can take a hash as well)
*/
- opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
+ private->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
- if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
- res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
+ if (private->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
+ res = hex2bin(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ private->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
break;
}
- if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) {
- memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
- opt->blobauth_len);
+ if (tpm2 &&
+ private->blobauth_len <=
+ sizeof(private->blobauth)) {
+ memcpy(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
+ private->blobauth_len);
break;
}
@@ -770,14 +778,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- opt->pcrlock = lock;
+ private->pcrlock = lock;
break;
case Opt_hash:
if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
- opt->hash = i;
+ private->hash = i;
break;
}
}
@@ -789,14 +797,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
}
break;
case Opt_policydigest:
- digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
+ digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash];
if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
return -EINVAL;
- res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
+ res = hex2bin(private->policydigest, args[0].from,
digest_len);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- opt->policydigest_len = digest_len;
+ private->policydigest_len = digest_len;
break;
case Opt_policyhandle:
if (!tpm2)
@@ -804,7 +812,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
if (res < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- opt->policyhandle = handle;
+ private->policyhandle = handle;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
@@ -815,6 +823,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private;
struct trusted_key_options *options;
int tpm2;
@@ -827,14 +836,23 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
/* set any non-zero defaults */
options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
- if (!tpm2)
- options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
+ private = kzalloc(sizeof(*private), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!private) {
+ kfree_sensitive(options);
+ options = NULL;
+ } else {
+ if (!tpm2)
+ private->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
+
+ options->private = private;
+ }
}
return options;
}
static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = NULL;
struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
int ret = 0;
int tpm2;
@@ -852,7 +870,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
goto out;
dump_options(options);
- if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
+ private = options->private;
+ if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -866,20 +885,22 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
goto out;
}
- if (options->pcrlock) {
- ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+ if (private->pcrlock) {
+ ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
}
}
out:
+ kfree_sensitive(options->private);
kfree_sensitive(options);
return ret;
}
static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = NULL;
struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
int ret = 0;
int tpm2;
@@ -897,7 +918,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
goto out;
dump_options(options);
- if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
+ private = options->private;
+ if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -909,14 +931,15 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
- if (options->pcrlock) {
- ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+ if (private->pcrlock) {
+ ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
goto out;
}
}
out:
+ kfree_sensitive(options->private);
kfree_sensitive(options);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 6340823f8b53..94e01249b921 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u8 *src, u32 len)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
- if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
+ if (private->blobauth_len == 0) {
unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
/* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
goto err;
}
- work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
+ work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, private->keyhandle);
work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
@@ -102,6 +103,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u8 **buf)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
int ret;
struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
u8 *blob;
@@ -121,7 +123,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
return -ENOMEM;
*buf = blob;
- options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
+ private->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
blob += ctx.priv_len;
@@ -233,6 +235,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
struct trusted_key_options *options)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
struct tpm_buf buf, sized;
int blob_len = 0;
@@ -240,11 +243,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
u32 flags;
int rc;
- hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
+ hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(private->hash);
if (hash < 0)
return hash;
- if (!options->keyhandle)
+ if (!private->keyhandle)
return -EINVAL;
rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
@@ -268,18 +271,19 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out_put;
}
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
if (rc)
goto out;
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
- options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ private->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* sensitive */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->blobauth_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, private->blobauth_len);
- if (options->blobauth_len)
- tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+ if (private->blobauth_len)
+ tpm_buf_append(&sized, private->blobauth,
+ private->blobauth_len);
tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, payload->key_len);
tpm_buf_append(&sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
@@ -292,14 +296,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
/* key properties */
flags = 0;
- flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
+ flags |= private->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
tpm_buf_append_u32(&sized, flags);
/* policy */
- tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->policydigest_len);
- if (options->policydigest_len)
- tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len);
+ tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, private->policydigest_len);
+ if (private->policydigest_len)
+ tpm_buf_append(&sized, private->policydigest,
+ private->policydigest_len);
/* public parameters */
tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
@@ -373,6 +378,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
u32 *blob_handle)
{
u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
struct tpm_buf buf;
unsigned int private_len;
unsigned int public_len;
@@ -392,7 +398,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
- if (!options->keyhandle)
+ if (!private->keyhandle)
return -EINVAL;
/* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
@@ -433,11 +439,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
return rc;
}
- rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
if (rc)
goto out;
- tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth,
+ tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, private->keyauth,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len);
@@ -481,6 +487,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u32 blob_handle)
{
+ struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private;
struct tpm_header *head;
struct tpm_buf buf;
u16 data_len;
@@ -502,10 +509,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (rc)
goto out;
- if (!options->policyhandle) {
+ if (!private->policyhandle) {
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
- options->blobauth,
- options->blobauth_len);
+ private->blobauth,
+ private->blobauth_len);
} else {
/*
* FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the
@@ -518,9 +525,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
* could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
* password.
*/
- tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle,
+ tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, private->policyhandle,
NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
- options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+ private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
} else {
--
2.43.0
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