[PATCH v5 2/3] ima: Make integrity_inode_attrs_changed() call into vfs
Roberto Sassu
roberto.sassu at huaweicloud.com
Wed Feb 4 12:34:09 UTC 2026
On Fri, 2026-01-30 at 16:39 -0600, Frederick Lawler wrote:
> Align integrity_inode_attrs_changed() to ima_check_last_writer()'s
> semantics when detecting changes.
>
> For IMA, stacked file systems that do not set kstat.change_cookie,
> integrity_inode_attrs_changed() will compare zero to zero, thus no
I setup overlay with two xfs filesystems, kept the file I want to be
audited in the lower filesystem.
Without this patch set, if I modify the lower file, changes are
detected, because actually the i_version is incremented.
In which situation there is a comparison zero to zero?
Thanks
Roberto
> change detected. This is not dissimilar to what
> ima_check_last_writer() does.
>
> No logical change intended for EVM.
>
> Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred at cloudflare.com>
> ---
> include/linux/integrity.h | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 5 ++---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 5 ++---
> 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
> index beb9ab19fa6257e79266b58bcb5f55b0c5445828..382c783f0fa3ae4a938cdf9559291ba1903a378e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/integrity.h
> +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
>
> #include <linux/fs.h>
> #include <linux/iversion.h>
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
>
> enum integrity_status {
> INTEGRITY_PASS = 0,
> @@ -62,14 +63,33 @@ integrity_inode_attrs_stat_changed
>
> /*
> * On stacked filesystems detect whether the inode or its content has changed.
> + *
> + * Must be called in process context.
> */
> static inline bool
> integrity_inode_attrs_changed(const struct integrity_inode_attributes *attrs,
> - const struct inode *inode)
> + struct file *file, struct inode *inode)
> {
> - return (inode->i_sb->s_dev != attrs->dev ||
> - inode->i_ino != attrs->ino ||
> - !inode_eq_iversion(inode, attrs->version));
> + struct kstat stat;
> +
> + might_sleep();
> +
> + if (inode->i_sb->s_dev != attrs->dev || inode->i_ino != attrs->ino)
> + return true;
> +
> + /*
> + * EVM currently relies on backing inode i_version. While IS_I_VERSION
> + * is not a good indicator of i_version support, this still retains
> + * the logic such that a re-evaluation should still occur for EVM, and
> + * only for IMA if vfs_getattr_nosec() fails.
> + */
> + if (!file || vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat,
> + STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE,
> + AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT))
> + return !IS_I_VERSION(inode) ||
> + !inode_eq_iversion(inode, attrs->version);
> +
> + return integrity_inode_attrs_stat_changed(attrs, &stat);
> }
>
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> index 73d500a375cb37a54f295b0e1e93fd6e5d9ecddc..6a4e0e246005246d5700b1db590c1759242b9cb6 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> @@ -752,9 +752,8 @@ bool evm_metadata_changed(struct inode *inode, struct inode *metadata_inode)
> bool ret = false;
>
> if (iint) {
> - ret = (!IS_I_VERSION(metadata_inode) ||
> - integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->metadata_inode,
> - metadata_inode));
> + ret = integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->metadata_inode,
> + NULL, metadata_inode);
> if (ret)
> iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 6570ad10887b9ea1172c78274cf62482350e87ff..8cb17c9d446caaa5a98f5ec8f027c17ba7babca8 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -328,9 +328,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
> real_inode = d_real_inode(file_dentry(file));
> if (real_inode != inode &&
> (action & IMA_DO_MASK) && (iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK)) {
> - if (!IS_I_VERSION(real_inode) ||
> - integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->real_inode,
> - real_inode)) {
> + if (integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->real_inode,
> + file, real_inode)) {
> iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
> iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
> }
>
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