[PATCH v2 0/4] Firmware LSM hook

Leon Romanovsky leon at kernel.org
Mon Apr 13 15:53:32 UTC 2026


On Sun, Apr 12, 2026 at 09:38:35PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Sun, Apr 12, 2026 at 5:00 AM Leon Romanovsky <leon at kernel.org> wrote:
> > On Thu, Apr 09, 2026 at 05:04:24PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > On Thu, Apr 9, 2026 at 8:45 AM Leon Romanovsky <leon at kernel.org> wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Apr 09, 2026 at 02:27:43PM +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, 2026-04-09 at 15:12 +0300, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> > > > > > On Tue, Mar 31, 2026 at 08:56:32AM +0300, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> 
> ...
> 
> > > > We implemented this approach in v1:
> > > > https://patch.msgid.link/20260309-fw-lsm-hook-v1-0-4a6422e63725@nvidia.com
> > > > and were advised to pursue a different direction.
> > >
> > > I'm assuming you are referring to my comments? If so, that isn't exactly what I said,
> > > I mentioned at least one other option besides
> > > going directly to BPF.  Ultimately, it is your choice to decide how
> > > you want to proceed, but to claim I advised you to avoid a LSM based
> > > solution isn't strictly correct.
> >
> > Yes, this matches how we understood your comments:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260311081955.GS12611@unreal/
> >
> > In the end, the goal is to build something practical and avoid adding
> > unnecessary complexity that brings no real benefit to users.
> >
> > > Regardless, looking at your v2 patchset, it looks like you've taken an
> > > unusual approach of using some of the LSM mechanisms, e.g. LSM_HOOK(),
> > > but not actually exposing a LSM hook with proper callbacks.
> > > Unfortunately, that's not something we want to support.  If you want
> > > to pursue an LSM based solution, complete with a security_XXX() hook,
> > > use of LSM_HOOK() macros, etc. then that's fine, I'm happy to work
> > > with you on that.
> >
> > The issue is that the sentence below was the reason we did not merge v1 with v2:
> > https://github.com/LinuxSecurityModule/kernel/blob/main/README.md#new-lsm-hooks
> > "pass through implementations, such as the BPF LSM, are not eligible for
> > LSM hook reference implementations."
> 
> I can expand on that in a minute, but I'd like to return to your use
> of the LSM_HOOK() macro and locating the hook within the BPF LSM as
> that is the most concerning issue from my perspective.  One should
> only use the LSM_HOOK() macro and locate code within bpf_lsm.c if that
> code is part of the BPF LSM, utilizing an LSM hook.  Since this
> patchset doesn't use an LSM hook or any part of the LSM framework, the
> implementation choices seem odd and are not something we want to
> support.  As mentioned in my prior reply, you could do something very
> similar though the use of a normal BPF hook similar to what was done
> with the update_socket_protocol() BPF hook.
> 
> There are multiple reasons why out-of-tree and pass through LSMs are
> not considered eligible for reference implementations of LSM hooks.  I
> think is most relevant to this patchset is that an out-of-tree hook
> implementation doesn't necessarily require a stable interface, and
> without a stable interface it is impossible to make a generic API at
> the LSM framework layer.  As you mentioned previously, each vendor and
> each firmware version brings the possibility of a new
> format/interface, and while that may not be a problem for out-of-tree
> code which is left to the user/admin to manage, it makes upstream
> development difficult.  I did mention at least one approach that might
> be a possibility to enable upstream, in-tree support of this, but you
> seem to prefer a BPF approach that doesn't require a well defined
> format.
> 
> > > However, if you've decided that your preferred
> > > option is to create a BPF hook you should avoid using things like
> > > LSM_HOOK() and locating your hook/code in bpf_lsm.c.
> >
> > We are not limited to LSM solution, the goal is to intercept commands
> > which are submitted to the FW and "security" bucket sounded right to us.
> 
> Yes, it does sound "security relevant", but without a well defined
> interface/format it is going to be difficult to write a generic LSM to
> have any level of granularity beyond a basic "load firmware"
> permission.
> 
> > > The good news is that there are plenty of other examples of BPF
> > > plugable code that you could use as an example, one such thing is the
> > > update_socket_protocol() BPF hook that was originally proposed as a
> > > LSM hook, but moved to a dedicated BPF hook as we generally want to
> > > avoid changing non-LSM kernel objects within the scope of the LSMs.
> > > While your proposed case is slightly different, I think the basic idea
> > > and mechanism should still be useful.
> > >
> > > https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1692147782.git.geliang.tang@suse.com
> >
> > Thanks
> 
> Good luck on whatever you choose, and while I'm guessing it is
> unlikely, if you do decide to pursue a LSM based solution please let
> us know and we can work with you to try and find ways to make it work.

Thanks a lot. We should know which direction we'll take in a week or two,
once Chiara wraps up her internal commitments and returns to this series.

I appreciate your help.

Thanks

> 
> -- 
> paul-moore.com
> 



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