[PATCH] evm: zero-initialize the evm_xattrs read buffer
Pengpeng Hou
pengpeng at iscas.ac.cn
Tue Apr 7 06:09:10 UTC 2026
evm_read_xattrs() allocates size + 1 bytes, fills them from the list of
enabled xattrs and then passes strlen(temp) to simple_read_from_buffer().
When no configured xattrs are enabled, the fill loop stores nothing and
temp[0] remains uninitialized, so strlen() reads beyond initialized
memory.
Use kzalloc() so the empty-list case stays a valid empty C string.
Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou <pengpeng at iscas.ac.cn>
---
security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index acd840461902..03d376fa36c2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_xattrs(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
size += strlen(xattr->name) + 1;
}
- temp = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ temp = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!temp) {
mutex_unlock(&xattr_list_mutex);
return -ENOMEM;
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)
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