[PATCH] pid: use ns_capable_noaudit() when determining net sysctl permissions
Serge E. Hallyn
serge at hallyn.com
Mon Sep 15 17:13:47 UTC 2025
On Mon, Sep 15, 2025 at 04:13:16PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 12, 2025 at 02:35:45PM -0500, Serge Hallyn wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 11, 2025 at 06:05:05PM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > On Thu, Sep 11, 2025 at 04:46:20PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > On Sep 10, 2025 =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgoettsche at seltendoof.de> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > The capability check should not be audited since it is only being used
> > > > > to determine the inode permissions. A failed check does not indicate a
> > > > > violation of security policy but, when an LSM is enabled, a denial audit
> > > > > message was being generated.
> > > > >
> > > > > The denial audit message can either lead to the capability being
> > > > > unnecessarily allowed in a security policy, or being silenced potentially
> > > > > masking a legitimate capability check at a later point in time.
> > > > >
> > > > > Similar to commit d6169b0206db ("net: Use ns_capable_noaudit() when
> > > > > determining net sysctl permissions")
> > > > >
> > > > > Fixes: 7863dcc72d0f ("pid: allow pid_max to be set per pid namespace")
> > > > > CC: Christian Brauner <brauner at kernel.org>
> > > > > CC: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org
> > > > > CC: selinux at vger.kernel.org
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones at googlemail.com>
> > > > > ---
> > > > > kernel/pid.c | 2 +-
> > > > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > >
> > > > Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com>
> > >
> > > Thanks.
> > >
> > > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge at hallyn.com>
> > >
> > > I'll queue this up in the capability tree, unless Christian wanted
> > > it in his.
> > >
> > > -serge
> >
> > I've included this in git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git#caps-next
>
> What's easier for you? Just want me to stuff this in the pidfs pile?
Yes, please go ahead, thanks.
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