[PATCH] pid: use ns_capable_noaudit() when determining net sysctl permissions

Serge E. Hallyn serge at hallyn.com
Thu Sep 11 23:05:05 UTC 2025


On Thu, Sep 11, 2025 at 04:46:20PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Sep 10, 2025 =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgoettsche at seltendoof.de> wrote:
> > 
> > The capability check should not be audited since it is only being used
> > to determine the inode permissions. A failed check does not indicate a
> > violation of security policy but, when an LSM is enabled, a denial audit
> > message was being generated.
> > 
> > The denial audit message can either lead to the capability being
> > unnecessarily allowed in a security policy, or being silenced potentially
> > masking a legitimate capability check at a later point in time.
> > 
> > Similar to commit d6169b0206db ("net: Use ns_capable_noaudit() when
> > determining net sysctl permissions")
> > 
> > Fixes: 7863dcc72d0f ("pid: allow pid_max to be set per pid namespace")
> > CC: Christian Brauner <brauner at kernel.org>
> > CC: linux-security-module at vger.kernel.org
> > CC: selinux at vger.kernel.org
> > Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones at googlemail.com>
> > ---
> >  kernel/pid.c | 2 +-
> >  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul at paul-moore.com>

Thanks.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge at hallyn.com>

I'll queue this up in the capability tree, unless Christian wanted
it in his.

-serge



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