[PATCH 2/2] ipe: Update documentation for script enforcement

Yanzhu Huang yanzhuhuang at linux.microsoft.com
Thu Oct 23 23:36:56 UTC 2025


This patch adds explanation of script enforcement mechanism in admin
guide documentation. Describes how IPE supports integrity enforcement
for indirectly executed scripts through the AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag, and
how this differs from kernel enforcement for compiled executables.

Signed-off-by: Yanzhu Huang <yanzhuhuang at linux.microsoft.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
index dc7088451f9d..1063256559a8 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
@@ -95,7 +95,20 @@ languages when these scripts are invoked by passing these program files
 to the interpreter. This is because the way interpreters execute these
 files; the scripts themselves are not evaluated as executable code
 through one of IPE's hooks, but they are merely text files that are read
-(as opposed to compiled executables) [#interpreters]_.
+(as opposed to compiled executables) [#interpreters]_. However, with the
+introduction of the ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` flag, interpreters can use it to
+signal the kernel that a script file will be executed, and request the
+kernel to perform LSM security checks on it.
+
+IPE's EXECUTE operation enforcement differs between compiled executables and
+interpreted scripts: For compiled executables, enforcement is triggered
+automatically by the kernel during ``execve()``, ``execveat()``, ``mmap()``
+and ``mprotect()`` syscalls when loading executable content. For interpreted
+scripts, enforcement requires explicit interpreter integration using
+``execveat()`` with ``AT_EXECVE_CHECK`` flag. Unlike exec syscalls that IPE
+intercepts during the execution process, this mechanism needs the interpreter
+to take the initiative, and existing interpreters won't be automatically
+supported unless the signal call is added.
 
 Threat Model
 ------------
-- 
2.43.0




More information about the Linux-security-module-archive mailing list